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Supporting the Work of Lesser Geniuses:
An Argument for Removing Obstructions to
Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research
BY
CHRISTOPHER

D.

HAZUKA*

INTRODUCTION

There is "no realm of medicine that might not be touched" by
embryonic stem (ES) cell research, according to Nobel laureate and former National Institutes of Health (NIH) director, Harold Varmus.' Not
only will ES cell-based therapies help save lives, but the development of
ES cell-based treatments will promote the growth of the biopharmaceutical industry, in addition to contributing to the economy at large.2 In
order to recognize the benefits of ES cell research, scientists require
financial support from public sources, private sources, or both. Two
independent roadblocks have recently threatened financial support for
ES cell research: the presence of broad patent claims covering the subject matter and moral concerns regarding the research.
Research on ES cells is just beginning. Therapeutic applications as
well as basic research results await discovery.' But patents4 granting
broad property rights covering the human ES (hES) cell to the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation5 (WARF) will limit exploration of the
* J.D. candidate, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 2003;
Ph.D., Neurosciences Program and Department of Molecular and Cellular Physiology, Stanford
University, 1999; B.A., Northwestern University, 1991. Thanks to Zoe F. Hazuka and to
Professors Mark Lemley, Marjorie Shultz, and Jay Wexler, and Cindy Adams, Ph.D., and Eva
Ogielska, J.D., Ph.D., for critically reading the manuscript.
1. John Davidson, Australia's Gene Genies, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Sep. 15, 2001, at 41,
available at 2001 WL 27344355. See generally Stein Cell Research News (2001), at http://www.
stemcellresearchnews.com.
2. The "market for stem cell-based treatments could be worth $US 200 billion a year or
more." Davidson, supra note 1, at 41.
3. "Whatever form stem cell therapy takes, whether it's cloned from the patient, tissuematched from a donor or stimulated endogenously, one thing is certain: most of the key
discoveries are yet to be made, and most of the intellectual property is yet to be staked out." Id.
See also Center for Science, Technology, & Congress at the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, From the Hill: New Limits on Funding of Stem Cell Research
Questioned, IssuEs Sci. & TECH. 29 (2001).
4. U.S. Patent No. 5,843,780 (issued Dec. 1, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (issued Mar.
13, 2001).
5. WARF is the organization that handles the patenting of inventions emanating from the
University of Wisconsin. This patent holder is Dr. James Thomson, a professor at the University
of Wisconsin.
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properties and potential uses of hES cells.6 WARF now owns property
rights covering the hES cell-a product of nature, whose existence was
already known. WARF's inventive leap was not the discovery of the
hES cell but rather the method for maintaining hES cells in an artificial
environment (in "culture") in such a way that they retain the ability to
transform into different cell-types, and the production of some unique
hES cell-lines.7 The contribution described in the WARF patents is
important because it enables scientists to use these cells to make mature
cells, organs, and tissues that can be used therapeutically. Nevertheless,
now that WARF owns broad property rights to any hES cell-rights that
are not coextensive with the inventive contribution to society-any
researcher must negotiate with WARF before using hES cells, even if
that researcher isolates new hES cells or uses a new method to do so.8
The hES cell patent product claims serve as an example of the phenomenon whereby downstream improvement-type research is stifled when
patents containing broad claims to basic research discoveries are issued.9
This article will analyze whether the incentive goals of the patent
laws are properly served when such broad claims to upstream or pioneering inventions'0 are granted. In effect, it uses the hES cell claims as
a case study. Although it is true that patents provide incentives for
inventors to invest resources in creating a specific invention, the patent
system may overlook the implications of such property rights on the
incentives of the community of inventors as a whole. The effects of
granting a limited monopoly right to a single entity must be weighed
against the negative effects that such a monopoly will have on subse-

6. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Stem Cell Research Is Slowed by Restrictions, Scientists Say, N.Y.
TiMEs, Sept. 25, 2002, at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/26/politics/26stem.html; Bush Stein
Cell Policy Has Not Met Promise, ASCB NEWSL., Sept. 2002, at I1; Researchers Dub President's
Stem Cell Policy a Failure, ASCB NEWSL., Nov. 2002, at 13; G. Steven McMillan et al., An
Analysis ofthe Critical Role of Public Science in hovation: The Case of Biotechnology, 29 R~s.
PoL'y I, I (2000) (discussing the importance of federal funding of basic research for
biotechnology companies, in contrast to pharmaceutical companies).
7. See discussion infra Part I.A.
8. See discussion infra Part I.D.
9. See discussion infra Part H.A. (defining downstream, basic and applied research, and
improvement inventions).
10. See discussion infra Part H.A. (defining upstream and pioneering inventions).
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quent innovators'': the so-called lesser geniuses.12
Part of the problem results from the fact that the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) properly does not consider the broad effects of
the issuance of a patent on the industry, academy, economy, or society.
Instead it looks only to its mandate to award property rights to inventors
who seemingly pass the bars set by patent doctrines. While the PTO is
correct in not attempting to take into account the broader implications of
issuing a patent, it must make sure that the traditional bars to patentability are sufficiently strictly enforced. The patent system can then achieve
its goal of providing incentives to all parties-the pioneer inventors and
the lesser geniuses-who may be involved in the development of an
invention. The hES cell patents provide a real-world context in which to
address this issue. Within this debate lie questions of where and when
property rights should be granted and protected. For example, should
the patent system promote the development of research tools or products, and purification or isolation of products of nature? And how
should the patent system balance incentivizing upstream pioneering discoveries and downstream improvement-type inventions?
The problem of the WARF patents impeding hES cell research is
exacerbated by a recent decision made by President George W. Bush to
fund with federal money only research on a limited number of hES celllines.' 3 President Bush was troubled by hES cell research because of
ethical concerns: to obtain an hES cell a living human embryo must be
destroyed. 4 To some, that is tantamount to murder.' 5 On August 9,
2001, President Bush attempted to find a compromise position: he
decided to limit federal funding to research on hES cells that existed
II. In economic terms, the general question is whether "assuming the patent system . . .
stimulat[es] technological innovation, [are] the social and economic costs of distortion in the
allocation of resources and the monopoly rents exacted by patent holders during the lives of their
patents greater than the social benefits of the new technologies?" David Silverstein, Patents,
Science, & Inovation: Historical Linkages & hnplications for Global Technological
Competitiveness, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 261, 303 (1991). Brian Peckham, Should
the U.S. Patent Laws Be Abolished?, I I J. CONTEMP. L. 389 (1985). "It is obvious that the
legitimate interests of companies may not coincide with scientists' research plans or our nation's
public health policy." Anthony Shadid, Kennedy Set to Speak Out Against Stem Cell Limits,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sep. 5, 2001, at Al (quoting Professor Douglas Melton's prepared comments
before the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee).
12. Judge Jerome Frank used the expression "lesser geniuses" in Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg.
Corp., 145 F.2d 961, 961 (2d Cir. 1944).
13. See infra text accompanying note 34.
14. See infra text accompanying note 21.
15. See Laurie Goodstein, Abortion Foes Split over Bush's Plan on Stein Cells, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 2001, at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/12/politics/I 2RIGH.html; see also Randall
Terry, on NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Aug. 9, 2001), availableat http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/july-dec01/stemcells_8-9.html.
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before his speech.' 6 Federal funding is not permissible for hES cells
obtained by destroying a human embryo after August 9, 2001.'7
The hES cell patents along with President Bush's decision provide
an opportunity to ask how federal funding interacts with the incentive
goals of the patent system with respect to upstream, basic research. The
two systems interact in various ways. First, federal funding and the patent system can be seen as complementary. Second, federal funding may
provide a mechanism through which to constrain broad property rights.
Although it is always important to ensure that patent property rights are
appropriately issued, it is crucial in the absence of federal funding. This
article will assume that federal funding does not exist for future hES cell
research. It will focus on the implications of the WARF product patent
claims on future incentives of private firms to fund or conduct hES cell
research.
Regarding the first type of interaction, the hES cell subject is particularly illustrative because it is at the nexus of the incentive problem:
the patent system (and private investment) is meant to pick up where
federal funding leaves off. Without federal funding, private organizations must have incentives to support research because scientists must
turn to private sources for money. These sources generally want something in return: in some transactions, property rights to the discoveries
or inventions. Indeed, the scientist who purified hES cells is a federally
funded university researcher who is primarily interested in basic
biomedical research.' 8 Nevertheless, he was forced to partially turn to
private funding from the biotechnology company, Geron, to carry out his
hES cell work because of the government's refusal to fund hES cell
research.' 9 As a result, he assigned some of the property rights to hES
cells to Geron.2 ° But this system only works when property rights do
not impede privately funded scientists from conducting research, and
when there are property rights to offer to the source of the funds. Based
16. See infra text accompanying note 34.
17. Katharine Q. Seelye, Bush Gives His Backing for Limited Research oii Existing Stei
Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 200!, at 2001 WL 26414517. See http://escr.nih.gov/for a list of the
hES cells-lines on which research using federal funding can be performed. The moral questions
surrounding hES cell research are difficult and several articles have been written analyzing them.
See, e.g., Jason H. Cassell, Lengthening the Stein: Allowing Federally Funded Researchers to
Derive Human Pluripotent Stein Cels fron Embryos, 34 U. Micii. J.L. REFORM 547 (2001); Nelle
S. Paegel, Use of Stein Cells inBiotechnological Research, 22 WHiTTIER L. REV. 1183 (2001).
While this article will not look at those issues, for the purposes of this article, I will consider hES
cell research moral because of the broad and important benefits it may offer sick, diseased, and
suffering people. Stem Cells: Potential for Good?, EcONOMIST, Aug. 18, 2001, at 59. The
research should be stimulated at the very least by the incentives provided by the patent system.
18. Frederic Golden, Cellu/ar Biology: Stein Winder, TIME, at 27 (Aug. 20, 2001).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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on this rationale, this article argues that overly broad patent rights to
upstream products of nature should not be granted because they unnecessarily remove incentives to future private organizations that wish to
fund or conduct downstream research. The presence of such broad patent claims will reduce the value of any future work, which may infringe
it. Thus, private funding will not complement federal funding.
Regarding the second interaction, federal funding of scientists promotes further development of discoveries, thus increasing the chances
that patent claims can be narrowed or "invented around" by future work.
In other words, in the absence of federal funding, the property rights
held by private organizations will generally be larger, stronger, and thus
more preclusive of the ability of other scientists to perform research in
the same field. It is even more important in the absence of federal funding to ensure that the patent claims do not cede more territory to the
patent holder than is warranted by the patent disclosure's contribution to
society. These ideas will be developed further in Parts II and III.
Part I describes the science underlying ES cell research and its
important applications. It then summarizes the legal and political environment surrounding the use of the technology, including decisions
regarding federal funding of the research. Finally, it turns to the issued
patents that cover ES cells. Part II discusses the theoretical implications
of broad patent claims on subsequent development of technology in general and as applied to hES cell research.
Part III describes how the patent system can better stimulate hES
cell research and therapy development, as well as general biotechnology
research, by insisting on a stricter application of patentability requirements. Application of higher bars to patentability can be achieved by
enforcing the existing patent statutes and case law. In particular, the
PTO and the courts should require that the invention be new, useful, and
have a component of human intervention, in other words, be an "invention." Specifically, Part III argues that a court should invalidate the hES
cell patent product claims on traditional patentability grounds, including
the utility, written description, enablement, and novelty requirements.
Alternatively, but less desirably, the scope of the hES cell product
claims could be interpreted narrowly. The scope of the claims should
accurately reflect the disclosed invention.
Briefly, this analysis as applied to the hES cell patents results in the
conclusion that the broad WARF patents product claims are invalid for
the following reasons. First, the material they cover is not new; hES
cells already existed in nature. Second, the biological matter as claimed
was not changed in any way by humans. Third, no clear use, other than
research use, has yet been demonstrated. Fourth, the inventive leap or
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contribution to society was not the discovery or purification of hES
cells, but: (I) discovery of a way to keep them alive in an artificial
environment in such a way that they can develop into many mature cells;
and (2) the production of a handful of unique hES cell-lines. As the
method is the inventive contribution to society, this method, and not all
freshly purified hES cells, should be protected by a property right. Similarly, just as a handful of human-made cell-lines were invented and contributed to society, WARF should receive patent product claims to cover
only those specific cell-lines. However, as WARF did not invent the
hES cell, the claims to all freshly purified hES cells should be invalidated by the courts. This analysis suggests that similar attempts to claim
property rights on fresh purifications of biological matter should be
closely scrutinized by the PTO and the courts.
Part IV inquires into the wisdom of Congress or the courts declaring, as a quick fix, certain areas of science patentable. The issue is dissected into two distinct subjects. First, Congress could, in general,
declare broad areas of technology off-limits to patenting. For example,
freshly purified human cells, human cells in general, or even broader
categories of biotechnology inventions could be declared unpatentable.
Second, either Congress or the courts could remove the property rights
solely with respect to hES cells. For example, Congress could address
the issue of the hES cell patents as part of its deliberation over how to
respond to President Bush's hES cell funding decision. Part IV concludes that neither of these options is desirable. In general, Congress
and the courts should avoid declaring certain areas of biotechnology
unpatentable. It is difficult to separate out inventive fields for such purposes, especially in unpredictable technologies. By enforcing existing
patent law instead, the system's flexibility will be maintained. The patent system relies on certainty, as industry players need to know how to
value patent rights. Congress should avoid intervening in the hES patent
situation. Although voiding patent claims as a part of policy-making
would be a quick remedy to the problems raised by the WARF patents,
Congress would needlessly introduce uncertainty into the system.

I.

THE PRESENT STATE OF

HES

CELL RESEARCH

This Part presents an overview of the present science understanding
of hES cells and the inventive leap that led to their successful purification and patenting. It discusses some applications of hES cell research,
both as illustrations of the importance of hES cell technology in developing cures for human disease and as examples of the reach of the
WARF patents. It concludes with President Bush's decision on how to
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regulate hES cell research and an introduction to the WARF patents and

their implications on future innovation.
A.

Stem Cell Science

An hES cell"' can develop into many of the roughly 220 different
types of cells found in a mature human being.22 Once a cell develops
into a characteristic mature cell, it is then committed to that fate. 23 For
example, a mature skin cell normally does not transform into a brain
cell. In contrast, ES cells are unique in that they can be manipulated into

differentiating into different cell types.24 It is this property that makes
these cells useful to scientists in their quest to develop new therapies for
treating disease.

After an egg is fertilized by a sperm cell, it gives rise to every type
of cell in the developing and mature human being. This fertilized egg
contains exactly the same genetic sequence as most developed cells in
the adult person to which it gives rise. 25 The fertilized egg begins to

divide, producing identical ES cells, each of which is capable by itself of
maturing into a person; in fact, this is the explanation for identical
cel continue to divide, forming the blastocyst, a sphere
twins. 26 These cells
of cells that is hollow in the middle except for what is called the inner

21. See National Institutes of Health, Stein Cells: A Primer (2000), at http://www.nih.gov/
news/stemcell/primer.htm [hereinafter NIH]; see also Audrey R. Chapman et al., Stein Cell
Research and Applications: Monitoring the Frontiers of Biomedical Research (1999), at http://
www.meta-library.netlstemcell/index body.html; Rick Weiss, A Crucial Human Cell Isolated,
Multiplied: Embryonic Building Block's Therapeutic Potential Stirs Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 6,
1998, at A01.
22. See, e.g., Laura DeFrancesco, Determining Embryonic Stem Cell Potential, 16 SCIENTIST
28 (2002).
23. Of course, advances in biological science may change this fundamental property.
24. Different stem cells might vary in their ability to become different types of cells. Some
are called toti potent, meaning that they are thought to be capable of becoming any type of cell.
NIH, supra note 21. Others are called pluri potent because they are capable of developing into
any cell derived from the three main germ cell layers, but are perhaps more limited in their
capacity than are toti potent cells. Id. Finally, there are multi potent stem cells, which have fewer
developmental possibilities than the prior two. Id. Multi potent stem cells are found in adult

tissue, such as the blood or bone marrow.

BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE

1283 (4th ed. 2002). ES cells derived in technically different ways might retain the ability
to differentiate in distinct ways, into different cell types, and the techniques for maintaining stem
cells in labs might alter their ability to differentiate. Id. at 474. Moreover, hES cells isolated from
different humans will be genetically distinct. Thus, depending on from where and how the ES
cells are isolated and maintained, they will have distinct identities and properties. This scientific
fact further illustrates the problem with issuing a patent covering all hES cells.
25. An intense area of scientific inquiry for decades has been the attempt to understand why
cells with the same genetic components (for example, the fertilized egg and an adult skin cell)
behave so differently. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 24, at 1157.
26. See NIH, supra note 21.
CELL
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cell mass.27 The inner cell mass gives rise to almost all of the tissues of
a human body.2 8
In order to isolate and culture hES cells, Dr. James Thomson of the
University of Wisconsin collected human embryos in the blastocyst
stage from in vitro fertilization (IVF) clinics, and removed the inner cell
mass.29 He was the first person to keep hES cells alive in culture in their
hES cell state. 31 In the process, he developed five distinct hES celllines. 3 1 Cell-lines are distinct from freshly purified cells because they
may have unique properties.32 It is important to keep in mind that these
two contributions represented the inventive leap that he contributed to
society. He did not contribute the hES cell itself, which was certainly
known prior to his invention.3 3 His contribution was to keep the hES
cells alive in culture for over a year in their hES cell state in such a way
that they retained their ability to transform into mature cells and to
develop a handful of hES cell-lines.
B.

Applications of hES Cell Research

The excitement generated by hES cell research is justifiable. First,
34
the importance of hES cells in scientific research cannot be overstated.
For example, scientists need such an early stage cell in order to understand how genes are turned on and off in development and in cancer.3 5
They will also be useful for developing and testing drugs; they could
dramatically speed up the drug discovery process. 36 For example, scientists could test potential anticancer drugs on cells or tissues derived from
hES cells that were derived from a person who suffers from the cancer.
Presently, scientists must use animal models and human testing in
clinical trials. More exotically, scientists envision a new era of "cell
therapies.1 37 Thomas Okarma, CEO of Geron (a company specializing
in stem cell technology), believes that "living cells will be tomorrow's
27. Id.
28. At this stage, these cells are now pluri potent because they are not capable, by themselves,
of forming a human being, but are capable of collectively forming the tissues of a human being.
Id.
29. J.A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts, 282
SCIENCE 1145 (1998).

30. See discussion infra Section lI.D. (describing more of his method for succeeding in
keeping the ES cells alive in culture in their pluri-potent state).
31. See Thomson et al., supra note 29.
32. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 24; see also infra notes 232 and accompanying text.
33. ALBIRTS ET AL., supra note 24, at 1308.

34.
35.
36.
37.

Chapman et al., supra note 21, at 6.
See NIH, supra note 21.
See iM.
See id.; Chapman et al., supra note 21, at 5-6.
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pharmaceuticals." 38 For example, patients with Parkinson's Disease suf-

fer from degeneration of dopaminergic neurons in their brains. 39 In
some diabetes patients insulin-secreting cells are impaired.

0

Some can-

cer patients need bone marrow transplants. Replacements for these lost
cells could be derived from hES cells and then transplanted into these

patients. Organs will likely be developed in vitro. Researchers have
already used ES cells to produce heart cells that, as a population, beat in
unison in a dish.4 In general, if one needs new cells, tissues, or organs,
this technology could be the answer. Hopefully, the availability of hES
cell-based therapies will eliminate both the need to ask people to donate
organs and tissues, and the problem arising from the fact that there are

far too few donors today.42
The greatest benefits of hES cell research likely will be realized in
combination with therapeutic human cloning techniques.4 3 One particularly promising area of future research involves the use of hES cells
isolated from cloned human embryos to custom make immuno-compatible replacement tissues, cells, and organs. Therapeutic human cloning
may be used to produce a human embryo clone of the person in need of
transplantable tissue. hES cells would be derived from this cloned
embryo when it is in the blastocyst stage. In this way, all hES cellsand differentiated cells and tissues resulting from them-would be
38. Associated Press, Seeking Profit in Stein Cells, (Jul. 13, 2001), available at www.wired.
com/news/print/0, 1294,45232,00.html.
39. ERIC R. KANDEL & JAMES H. SCHWARTZ, PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE 529 (2nd ed.

1985).
40. See NIH, supra note 21.
41. Weiss, supra note 21, at A01.
42. Monique C. Gorsline & Rachelle L.K. Johnson, The United States System of Organ
Donation, the International Solution, and the Cadaveric Organ Donor Act: "And the Winner Is
....
" 20 J. CORP. L. 5, 6-7 (1995); Laurel R. Siegel, Re-Engineering the Laws of Organ
Transplantation, 49 EMORY L.J. 917, 917 (2000).
43. See NIH, supra note 21; Anne McLaren, Cloning: Pathways to a Pluripotent Future, 288
SCIENCE 1775 (2000); Robert P. Lanza et al., The Ethical Validity of Using Nuclear Tran.sfer in
Hunan Transplantation, 284 J. AMER. MED. ASS'N 3175 (2000); John D. Loike, Member
Opinion: Bioethical and Legal Boundaries of Hanan Cloning, ASCB NEWSL., July 2001, at 2.
Indeed, many fear stem cell research precisely because of its application of human cloning
techniques: "the greatest anxiety about stem-cell research is that it will make human cloning
respectable. Many of the techniques being perfected for the medical application to stem cells are
just a hop, skip, and a jump away from those that could apply to reproductive cloning." Gregg
Easterbrook, Cloning and a Change in the Meaning of Life: Steml-Cell Research, 413 CURRENT 19
(1999). Indeed, President Bush did not even attempt to compromise on the cloning issue. While
nearly everyone agrees that cloning to produce adult human clones ("reproductive cloning")
should be banned, many scientists, ethicists, and politicians believe that the technology should
remain open for use as a research tool or to prepare hES cells ("therapeutic cloning").
Nevertheless, President Bush has called for a ban on all aspects of the technology. See Sonya
Ross, President Bush Pressesfor Ban on Hunan Cloning, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. I I, 2002,
at IA, available at 2002 WL 5192113.
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genetically identical to the person who needs the replacement tissue.
Such genetically identical tissues are desirable because it is believed that

they may eliminate many of the problems associated with immunorejection of transplanted tissue."4
In the future, organs and transplantable cells and tissues may be
immuno-compatible and in ready supply. Asking relatives to donate
organs, using organs from deceased people or from animals, using
mechanical organs, and requiring blood and tissue banks might become
obsolete. This great advantage of hES cell research may not be realized
using adult stem cells. The attempt to create a genetically identical cell
or tissue will likely require the creation and destruction of a human

blastocyst.
C.

Political and Legal Reaction to Stem Cell Science: President
Bush's Decision Allowing Federal Funding of hES
Cell Research

President Bush's response to hES cell research was influenced by
prior regulation of embryo research, beginning with IVF technology.45
44. NIH, supra note 21.
45. Legislation and administrative decisions concerning IVF through 2001. In 1974,
Congress established the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, in part to assess the desirability of research on the human
fetus. REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NBAC, ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM CELL
RESEARCH 29 (1999) [hereinafter NBAC REPORT]. This Commission's recommendations resulted
in Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46, Part 46, which contains regulations on IVF
promulgated by what is now the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). These
regulations, which are utilized by most agencies or departments that administer federal funds for
human research, cover all "grants and contracts [administered by the DHHS] supporting research,
development, and related activities" involving IVF. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201 (1994). To achieve
funding from the DHHS, all applications or proposals involving human IVF must be reviewed by
an Ethical Advisory Board (EAB). See 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(d), nullified by § 121(c) of the NIH
Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-43, 107 Stat. 122, § 121(c) (1993); see also 59 Fed. Reg.
28,276 (June 1, 1994).
Initially, an EAB recommended funding for embryo research. NATIONAL INSTITUTES Or
HEALTH, DEVELOPMENT OF NIH GUIDELINES GOVERNING RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION AND THE PREIMPLANTION EMBRYO (1995). No IVF research was funded with
federal money; however, because the NIH never initiated any projects. NBAC REPORT, supra at
42. This Board reviewed one application for IVF research, but its recommendations were not
followed, and the Board was disbanded until the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993. Id.
Interestingly, in its one review, the EAB approved federal funding of IVF research pursuant to the
following guidelines: (1)informed consent from donors of the gametes; (2) the scientific goal of
the research was not reasonably attainable by other means; and (3) the embryo must not be
maintained in vitro beyond the stage normally associated with the completion of implantation
(normally about fourteen days post fertilization). Id. No subsequent EAB was impaneled and,
accordingly, no embryo research was funded. This de facto moratorium on human fetal, IVF, and
embryonic research was lifted in 1993 with the passage of the NIH Revitalization Act. National
Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, supra. Not only was the EAB impaneled, but the
presumption was reversed: research could now be funded unless the EAB recommended
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This background informed the debate over whether to regulate research
involving hES cells.4 6 Major ethical concerns are raised when considering whether to fund (or even allow) this type of research. On one hand,
many are concerned with destroying a human embryo, viewing the
embryo as a living person.47 Others are simply afraid of "playing God"
with biology.4 8 On the other hand, such research may help save lives,
otherwise. NBAC REPORT, supra, at 42. But because of the subject's sensitivity NIH Director
Harold Varmus established a Human Embryo Research Panel to attempt to devise standards for
determining which research could be funded consistent with ethical considerations. 59 Fed. Reg.
28,874, 28,875 (June 3, 1994) (notice of meeting). Similar to the conclusions of the EAB almost
fifteen years before, this new Panel considered ethically permissible the use of IVF for certain
research purposes. National Institutes of Health, Report of the Human Embryo Research Panel,
Sept. 27, 1994 [hereinafter NIH, REPORT]; Laurie McGinley, U.S. Panel Backs Human-Embryo
Studies, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1994, at 26. Nevertheless, both President Clinton and
Congress clarified that federal funds could not be used for experiments in which embryos are
destroyed. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Statement by the President
(Dec. 2, 1994); Balanced Budget Downpayment Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat.
26, 34 (1996). As a result, Dr. Thomson first isolated hES cells by working "in a room in which
not a single piece of equipment, not even an electrical extension cord, had been bought with
federal funds." Weiss, supra note 21.
46. Legislation and administrative decisions focused on hES cell research through 2001. The
Human Embryo Research Panel, supra note 45, found it permissible to create embryos using IVF
techniques for the sole purpose of purifying stem cells. NIH, REPORT, supra note 45. Yet
President Clinton issued a directive order specifying that such research was impermissible. Press
Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Statement by the President (Dec. 2, 1994).
Moreover, Congress, in what is known as the "Dickey Amendment" to a 1995 appropriations bill,
further narrowed the research subject to federal funding, excluding funding for: (1) the creation of
a human embryo or embryos for research purposes; or (2) research in which a human embryo or
embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than
that allowed for research on fetuses in utero under 45 C.F.R. § 46.208(a)(2) and § 498(b) of the
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 289g(b)). Pub. L. No. 104-99, 110 Stat. 26, 34 (1996).
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-386 (1998). The definition of human embryo for the
purposes of this legislation is "any organism, not protected as a human subject under 45 CFR § 46
as of the date of the enactment of this Act, that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis,
cloning, or any other means from one or more human gametes or human diploid cells." Pub. L.
No. 104-99, 110 Stat. 26, 34 (1996).
Harriet Rabb, general counsel of the DHHS, wrote a memorandum explicating a loophole
through which funding of hES cell research could escape. Memorandum from Harriet Rabb, to
Harold Varmus (Jan. 15, 1999). The reasoning was that hES cells are not human embryos. Thus,
federal money could be applied to hES cell research as long as that money was not used to isolate
the hES cells (a process that results in the destruction of the embryo); federally funded researchers
could thus simply rely on private funding to isolate the hES cells. On August 25, 2000, federal
money for hES cell research was finally authorized on the conditions that the hES cells were
obtained without federal funds "from embryos that were created for the purposes of fertility
treatment and were in excess of the clinical need of the individuals seeking such treatment." NIH
Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, at www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/
stemcellguidelines.htm.
47. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Ronald Bailey, Remaking Eden: Cloning & Beyond in a Brave New World, 30
REASON 63 (1998) (discussing the moral implications of human cloning and, by extension, hES
cell research).
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cure disease, and eliminate painful or debilitating disorders. Against this
background, on August 9, 2001, President Bush announced a compromise position, allowing federal funding for experiments using hES cells
obtained before his speech, but not for those using cells obtained after-

ward. 4'9 This decision was meant to satisfy those who lobbied for the

research and those who feel that destruction of a human embryo is morally repugnant.
The reaction was mixed. For example, the conservative Christian
group, Focus on the Family, was "pleasantly surprised" with the decision, while the National Conference of Catholic Bishops found it "morally unacceptable." 5 0 And while scientists breathed a sigh of relief that
the research was not banned altogether, immediate concerns arose
regarding the number and viability of the cell-lines that existed prior to
President Bush's speech. 5 ' Specifically, it is likely true that: (1) the
existing cell-lines only represent a very narrow range of the genetic

diversity present in the human species; (2) cells, tissues, and organs
made from the existing cell-lines may not be safe for therapeutic use in
humans;52 (3) the existing cell-lines are not robust enough to last long
enough for many laboratories to use them over an extended period of
time; and (4) it may be difficult for scientists to obtain the existing celllines at a reasonable cost and time.53

The first concern alone is troubling. hES cells isolated from different humans will be genetically distinct. Thus, depending on from where
and how the ES cells are isolated and maintained, they will have distinct
49. See Seelye, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
50. Goodstein, supra note 15.
51. "In practice, however ....there are far fewer than 60 useful lines available to researchers.
Some existing lines are hard to grow; some are ill-characterised; some are tied up in patent
paperwork that limits their use." Stem Cells: Potential for Good?, supra note 17. See also supra
note 6; NIH Human Embryonic Stem Cell Registry, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. web
site, at http://escr.nih.gov; Adam Clymer, The Stem Cell Battle Moves to Congress, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 12, 2001, available at www.nytimes.com/2001/08/12/politics/I 2CONG.html; Krista Conger,
Researchers Have Mixed Reactions to President's Stem Cell Decision, STAN. REP., Aug. 22, 2001,
available at http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/august22/stemcelldecision.html; Will Dunham,
Most Cell Colonies Not Yet Usable-U.S. Official, REUTERS (2001), available at http://
dailynews.yahoo.com/htx/nm/20010905/pl/health-stemcell-dc_5.html. In addition, the most
prestigious body of scientists in the United States, the National Academy of Sciences, called for
the production of more stem cell lines. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Controversy over Cloning Reignites
in Congress, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 18, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/18/health/
genetics/l8CELL.html. This report, issued on Sep. 11,2001, was disregarded by the media in
light of the terrorist attacks.
52. For example, some scientists are concerned that these cell-lines are prepared and
maintained in cultures with mouse cells. See Center for Science, Technology, & Congress at the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, supra note 3, at 30.
53. See id.
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identities and properties.54 This is critically important for research and
therapeutic purposes. From a research perspective, if a scientist is interested in finding therapies for a specific disease, it would be valuable to
obtain hES cells derived from a person who is known to suffer from that
disease." The scientist may then study how hES cells with the same
putative disease-inducing genes mature into diseased cells, tissues, or
organs. From a therapeutic perspective, the first, second, and third concerns are critical; medical researchers need to ensure that hES cells are
prepared so that they are safe for introduction into people.5 6 Learning
how to prepare hES cells safely requires experimentation. The existing
hES cell-lines already may be inappropriate for human use. Moreover,
different laboratory methods might have important implications for the
usefulness of an hES cell-line. For example, hES cells derived in technically different ways might retain the ability to differentiate in distinct
ways, into different cell types. Similarly, the techniques for maintaining
hES cells in laboratories might alter their ability to differentiate.
More generally speaking, according to James Thomson, "The current ban in the United States on the use of federal funding for humanembryo research discourages the majority of the best United States
researchers from advancing this promising area of medical research."5
Lack of funding from the federal government puts the burden of supporting hES cell research on the private sector, but companies are not
picking up the slack. For example, as of 2002, Geron provided more
money in support of hES cell research to academic institutions than any
other company. 58 That amount was only about $4.7 million in 2001 and
about $3.4 million in 2002.59 By contrast, the NIH last year contributed
over thirty-one times that amount to human adult stem cell researchers.60
An additional problem is that, in contrast to federally funded researchers, private companies need not disclose their results or their research.
54. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 24.
55. Ruthann Richter, Stem Cell Pursuits, 19 STAN. MED. 11 (2002).
[Y]ou want to be able to obtain samples from people with a known genetic
predilection for a disease, so that, [for example,] when you develop a blood vessel
cell from an [ES] cell, it comes from someone with a family with a high risk of heart
disease and stroke. That way you would be working on something really relevant to
that disease.
Id. (quoting Dr. Irving Weissman).
56. Conger, supra note 51 (quoting Dr. Irving Weissman).
57. Wired News Report, Human Cell Growth Patented, WIRED, Dec. 9, 1998, at www.wired.
com/news/print/0, 1294,16730,00.html.
58. The "next biggest contributor to stem cell research, the Juvenile Diabetes Research
Foundation, spent only $1.2 million last year." Paul Elias, Company Bets on Embryonic
Research, POPSCI WIRE, Aug. 2, 2001 (on file with author).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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Thus, what little hES cell research is occurring is being performed without oversight.6 '

As time has passed, proponents of both sides have voiced disappointment in President Bush's decision.6 2 Congress's response to the
decision has been mixed. For example, Republican Senator Arlen Specter has introduced a bill that would allow federally funded scientists not
only to use any hES cell-line in experiments, but to create new hES celllines by extracting them from embryos.63 Disregarding a veto threat by
President Bush, members of the House and Senate called for hearings to
determine whether funding should be extended to the production of new
hES cell-lines.6 4 Nevertheless, President Bush's decision stands for
now; the result is that most hES cell research will likely be funded by
private organizations.
D.

Patent Issues Relating to hES Cell Research

To understand its effects fully, the lack of federal funding of hES
cell research must be examined in the context of private funding. Private funding of biotechnology research is intimately related to the presence of patents covering the technology or products being developed.6 5
A standard justification for the patent system is that investors will not

fund private ventures without the incentives provided by patent protection.6 6 Conversely, when trying to assess the effectiveness of the patent
system at providing ideal incentives to innovators, one must consider
other incentives, such as federal funding.6 7
Application of these principles to the present hES cell research
61. See Easterbrook, supra note 43.
62. For example, Daniel Parry, executive director of the Alliance for Aging Research, an
advocacy group that promotes stem cell research, stated, "The president's Aug. 9 speech managed
to confound both sides. It was a temporary compromise that allowed voices on both sides to be
calmed temporarily." Stolberg, supra note 51.
63. Id.
64. Clymer, supra note 51. Frank Bruni, Bush Says He Will Veto Any Bill Broadening His
Stein Cell Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001, at Al, available at www.nytimes.com/2001/08/14/
politics/I4BUSH.html; Chris Adams, Congress Braces for Vigorous Debate on Bush's Stein-Cell
Funding, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2001, at AI0; Justin Gillis & Ceci Connolly, Bush Policy on Stein
Cells Appears Safe on Hill, WASH. POST, Sep. 2, 2001, at A15. These hearings have been put on
hold in light of the Sep. 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
65. It is true that there is a middle ground of research that is incentivized by both federal
funding and patents. The prime example is universities, although companies sometimes also
receive federal funds.
66. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 137 (2000).
67. John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products
and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101 (2001) ("[Tlhe multi-billion dollar
system of investment, mostly public and mostly university-based . . . provides most of the
researchers and basic research that drives modern biotechnology."). Id.
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environment suggests that the financing system for hES cell research has

broken down. As described below, a single entity (WARF) owns the
patent rights to hES cells, allowing it to control the direction of future
research.68 The looming presence of this strong property right along
with the lack of federal funding results in diminished incentives for
other researchers to develop therapies. Developments in hES cell technology will be inhibited.
1.

AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT DOCTRINES

The basis of U.S. patent law, as expressed in the Constitution, is to

provide incentives to invent and create. One of the enumerated powers
given to Congress is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. 6 9 With respect
to inventions, Congress has implemented this power with statutes whose
primary goal is to give inventors a limited "monopoly" 7 of roughly

twenty years 7' in exchange for disclosure of the invention. This bargain
is realized in the structure of the patent. A patent consists of claims,7 2
which define the boundaries of the property right, and a disclosure,

which provides a written description of the best mode73 for making and
using ("enabling") the invention. To receive a property right, a patent
applicant must contribute something to society. This requirement is formally set down in the requirements of usefulness, 74 novelty,7 5 and

nonobviousness.76
The PTO and the courts attempt to ensure that the property right as
68. "Geron's investments give it commercial rights to the research. Geron provided nearly all
the funds that enabled Wisconsin researcher Jamie Thomson to discover human embryonic stem
cells in 1998." Elias, supra note 58.
69. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
70. Monopoly is emphasized because the patent laws do not award a monopoly as it is known
conventionally. As will be discussed infra Part III, patent property rights are typically narrower
than the market power present in traditional monopolies. Moreover, future innovators may
receive "blocking" patents for an innovation that makes a significantly better use of the first
invention. In such a situation, the first patent holder will be forced to bargain with the second
patent holder if she wishes to take advantage of the advances covered by the claims of the second
patent.
71. See Drug Price Competition & Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 U.S.C. § 156
(2002). In the pharmaceutical field, a twenty-year patent in effect may be much shorter due to the
length of time it takes to receive Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. There is an
opportunity, however to extend the life of the patent by the length of time it took for the FDA to
review the drug. Id.
72. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2002).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 101.
75. Id. § 102.
76. Id. § 103. Each of these doctrines will be discussed further infra Part Ill.
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defined by the claims is only so large as the patent disclosure warrants.7 7
Initially, a patent applicant submits an application to the PTO for examination. The PTO looks specifically for utility, novelty, and nonobviousness in the claims, and for enablement, written description, and best
mode in the disclosure. Once the PTO deems these requirements satisfied, it issues the patent claims. Afterward, there is a short period of
reexamination wherein the patent can be revoked. 78 Finally, a patent can
be the subject of litigation. Typically, a patent holder sues a party for
infringement of the patent claims. As a defense, the infringer argues that
the patent claims are invalid: that the court should strike down the
claims on the ground that the PTO erred in issuing them because they
did not pass the requirements listed above.79 Courts also define the
scope of claims, when not invalidating them.8" Thus, both the PTO and
the courts play roles in defining the extent to which patent property
rights are granted, and the scope of those rights.
The fundamental idea underpinning patent statutes, PTO examination, and case law is that, without the reward of a "monopoly," inventors
would not invest the time or money to contribute new and useful things
to society. A premise of this notion is that such inventions would not be
contributed in the absence of the patent system. However, because the
goal of the patent system is to provide incentives to innovate, patent law
must be carefully calibrated so as not to concomitantly stifle invention;
unwarranted monopoly power must be vigilantly guarded against.
Although it may be true that patents are necessary to encourage innovation, they may also stifle it if the property rights awarded are too broad.
One must always keep in mind the effect of a property right on subsequent innovators.
Failure to strictly adhere to patent doctrines results in patents that
do not serve these policy goals well. For example, when property rights
are awarded for a discovery that is not new, subsequent development of
the discovery may be inhibited. One manifestation of this is the recent
troubling issuance of property rights covering DNA sequences. Such
patents are inappropriate based on patent doctrine: the sequence is not
new (it is a product of nature) and not always immediately useful.
Moreover, from a broader perspective, is the patent system promoting
innovation overall when thousands of laboratories, physicians, and
77. See generally infra note 155.
78. See Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in Administrative Revocation of U.S.
Patents: A Proposition for Opposition-And Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH Tecti.
L.J. 63, 80-103 (1998).
79. One who fears that she may infringe a patent claim may only obtain a declaratory
judgment if she can show that she is likely to be sued by the patent holder for infringement.
80. See infra note 155, at 840.
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scientists must then pay for the right to study or use the DNA sequence
to develop therapies? It is relatively clear that the PTO properly ignores
such implications; the PTO is not suited to make economic analyses
concerning the effects of a patent on an industry. Nonetheless, the PTO
can continue to adhere to its practice of using patent doctrines without
considering broad economic implications and avoid negatively affecting
innovation, as long as it focuses on issuing only narrow claims that truly
cover the inventive leap disclosed, and ensures that the invention is truly
new. In this respect, the PTO and the courts should be careful before
issuing or upholding patent claims to products, especially products of
nature. This is only meant to be a short introduction to this subject.
These ideas, as well as the patent doctrines set out by statute, will be
discussed in more detail in Part III.

2.

THE

WARF

PATENTS 8J

WARF holds patents (licensed from Dr. James Thomson) for the
isolating and culturing method, as well as for the primate and human ES
cells themselves as represented by the product claims. 8 2 WARF's patents cover not only the cell-lines Dr. Thomson isolated, but all hES
cells. The effect of this broad property right on subsequent innovation
will be discussed extensively below.
Dr. Thomson's method required the destruction of human blastocysts in order to purify the pluri potent cells found in the inner cell mass.
According to Dr. Thomson, the hES cells he described in his patent can
remain in their pluri potent state-that is, they remain stem cells with
the capacity to become most of the mature cells of the body-for over a
year and can be coaxed into differentiating into different types of mature
cells. 83 This feat-not the purification of the hES cells-represents the
inventive step contributed by Dr. Thomson. Scientists, long aware of
the existence of ES cells,8 4 had been searching for years for ways to
keep them alive in their pluri potent state in petri dishes (in "culture") in
such a way that they retained their ability to differentiate into the various
mature cells of the adult body." Dr. Thompson "credited his success in
part to the recent availability of new nutrient broths that have made it
81. There are also other less broad patents: U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,874,301 (issued Feb. 23, 1999) &
5,914,268 (issued June 22, 1999) (held by the National Jewish Center for Immunology and
Respiratory Medicine); U.S. Pat. No. 5,453,357 (issued Sep. 26, 1995) (held by Vanderbilt

University).
82. Associated Press, Where the Stem Cells Are, Aug. 27, 2001. See also infra Part 1.D.3.

83. U.S. Pat. No. 6,200,806, supra note 4.
84. See Weiss, supra note 21.
85. Id.
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easier to grow human embryos up to" 86 the blastocyst stage. Although
this method represents the inventive leap, WARF was able to obtain the
following two broad product claims.
a. The Primate Patent Product Claim
Claim 1. A purified preparation of primate embryonic stem cells
which (i) is capable of proliferation in an in vitro culture for over one
year, (ii) maintains a karyotype in which all the chromosomes characteristic of the primate species are present and not noticeably altered
through prolonged culture, (iii) maintains the potential to differentiate
into derivatives of endoderm, mesoderm, and ectoderm tissues
throughout the culture, and (iv) will not differentiate when cultured
on a fibroblast feeder layer. 87
b.

The hES Cell Patent Product Claim

Claim 1. A purified preparation of pluripotent human embryonic stem
cells which (i) will proliferate in an in vitro culture for over one year,
(ii) maintains a karyotype in which the chromosomes are euploid and
not altered through prolonged culture, (iii) maintains the potential to
differentiate to derivatives of endoderm, mesoderm, and ectoderm tissues throughout the culture, and (iv) is inhibited from differentiation
when cultured on a fibroblast feeder layer.88
3.

IMPLICATIONS OF

WARF's ES

CELL PATENTS

The ES cell patents cede a remarkable amount of territory to
WARF. In effect, WARF has staked out an interest in, as well as the
possibility of controlling, all future hES cell research and product development, regardless of how or from where the hES cells are derived.8 9
Carl Gulbrandsen, WARF's managing director, has interpreted these
claims to apply "to any cell that is derived from a human embryo and
continues to thrive and multiply without specializing." 9 By this rationale, even though others might develop different methods of preparing
hES cells, they still must deal with WARF before using them. 9' One
86. Id.
87. U.S. Pat. No. 5,843,780, supra note 4. Note that there are method claims.
88. U.S. Pat. No. 6,200,806, supra note 4 (emphasis added). Note that there are method
claims.
89. N. Zeke Campfield, U. Wisconsin: Stem-Cell Research Places U. Wisconsin in National
Spotlight, BADGER HERALD, Aug. 31, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24685338. And "as inventors
and owners of the patent for the human embryonic stem cell, owners of five of the reported 64 cell
lines in existence and with other scientists unable to create new cell lines, UW is now a major
player in the future of this new science." Id.
90. Id.
91. "WARF believes that virtually all of the other embryonic cell lines now in existence come
under the Thomson patent and cannot be imported into the United States for use by NIH
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implication this scenario is that if doctors prepare hES cells from a person as part of the process of making immuno-compatible tissues or
organs, they will infringe the patent claim. Gulbrandsen adds that "distributors of all human embryonic stem cell lines will need a license from
WARF."92 Not only may WARF control who uses hES cells in the
United States, but it may also control their research and development
agenda.93
The WARF patents and President Bush's decision may combine to
lethally block subsequent research. First, from an intellectual property
perspective, WARF's claims may have been strengthened by President
Bush's decision. The WARF patent product claims are very broad even
in the absence of President Bush's decision. 94 His decision can only
contribute to their breadth because without federal funding fewer scientists will be able to work in the field. 95 Additionally, in the absence of
competing research the chances of creating future innovations that may
block, compete with, or "invent around" the use of the hES cell-lines in
existence before President Bush's speech become marginal. 96
Second, the value of the WARF patents, especially in combination
researchers unless they are licensed by WARF." Paul Recer, Bush Challenged on Stem Cells (on
file with author). However, note that Geron reported preparation of ES cells without using feeder
cells, a limitation that is explicitly stated in the WARF patent claims. Xu et al., Feeder-free
Growth of Undifferentiated Human Embryonic Stein Cells, 19 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 971
(2001). See also Cell Cultures: Breakthrough in Scalable Growth of Human Embryonic Stein
Cells Achieved, GENOMICS & GENETICS WEEKLY, Nov. 16, 2001, at 18, at NewsRx.com.
92. Aaron Nathans, UW, NIH Reach Deal on Stein Cells: WARF Will Allow Widespread
Nonprofit Research, Wis. ST. J., Sep. 6, 2001, at 2A, available at 2001 WL 25524490.
93. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Patent Laws May Determine Shape of Stem Cell Research, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2001, available at www.nytimes.com/2001/08/17/politics/I7CELL.html. "[Tlhe
foundation has granted important rights to ...

Geron ....

giving that company considerable say

over who ultimately profits from stem cell therapies." Id. "People complain about OPEC being a
monopoly, but even they have eleven members." Center for Science, Technology, & Congress at
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, supra note 3, at 30 (quoting Senator
Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee,
commenting on WARF's hold on ES cell research).
94. "There's never been a scientific project in the history of humankind that was owned this
far [upstream] ... for WARF to own the actual stem cell lines is as close to patenting NATURE as
you can get." Julia Brunts, Now Embryonic Stein Cell Research Faces Tests in Legal Sphere, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 20, 2001, at I (quoting bioethicist Glenn McGee).
95. "No one got luckier [after Bush's decision] than UW researcher James Thomson, who has
quickly risen to fame-his face even appeared on the cover of Time magazine." Campfield, supra
note 89; see also James Kelly, Our Scientific Method, TIME, Aug. 20, 2001, at 4.
96. "Bush's decision may have strengthened the hands of the [WARF] and Geron. By
refusing to allow taxpayer money to finance creation of new cell lines in this country, Mr. Bush
reduced the chances that scientists would derive and patent cells that might challenge Wisconsin's
dominance in the field." Stolberg, supra note 93. Additionally, "researchers in other countries
have a double advantage [because] other nations, notably Britain, have fewer restrictions on
studies of human embryos" and they need not worry about infringing the U.S. patent. Id.; see also
Brunts, supra note 94.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:157

with President Bush's decision, cannot be overstated.9 7 Academic scientists now must sign licensing agreements with WARF and those who
owned hES cells prior to August 9, 2002, if they wish to conduct their
research consistent with President Bush's decision. 98 Any such agree-

ment will undoubtedly award commercialization rights to any discovery
made by the licensee to the licensor. 99 Private companies will likely
wisely devote their energy and capital to other lines of research. Some,
97. For example, four days after President Bush's decision, WARF sued Geron in an attempt
to block it from exercising an option giving it control of all of WARF's stem cell lines. The suit
was amended on September 25, 2001. David P. Hamilton, Geron Faces Further Complaints in
Suit by Steni-Cell Patent Owner, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2001, at B2, available at 2001 WL-WSJ
2876589. Geron had obtained exclusive rights from WARF to develop ES cells into liver, muscle,
nerve, pancreas, blood, and bone cells. Stolberg, supra note 93. Geron's exclusive licenses to the
WARF patents "might mean that anyone seeking to develop commercial applications of stem cells
must negotiate with Geron first." Id. WARF and Geron settled in January, 2002. Andrew
Pollack, University Resolves Dispute on Stein Cell Patent, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2002, at Cl 1. The
agreement gives Geron exclusive commercial rights to neural, heart, and pancreatic islet cells, and
non-exclusive rights to commercially develop treatments based on bone, blood, and cartilage cells.
98. After President Bush's decision, DHHS Secretary Tommy Thompson's first priority was
to ensure that WARF would not use its patent to block access of basic researchers to the putative
sixty-four cell lines mentioned by President Bush. A deal was reached on September 4, 2001.
Memorandum of Understanding, Embryonic Stem Cell Research at the University of WisconsinMadison, available at http://www.news.wisc.edu/packages/stemcells/index/msql?get=6458; Laura
Meckler, Deal Made in Stem Cell Patent Issues (on file with author). The deal permits NIH
scientists to publish their research results. Additionally, "NIH will retain ownership to any new
intellectual property that might arise from the conduct of its research in this area." Wicell Signs
Stem Cell Research Agreement, Embryonic Stein Cell Research at the University of WisconsinMadison, at http://www.news.wisc.edu/packages/stemcells/index.html. Nevertheless, Wisconsin
retains commercial rights to its materials. "The use of the patent rights, the agreement states, will
be for teaching or non-commercial research only. The Wisconsin patent rights do not cover
commercial applications arising from research using the cells .... Such commercial applications
would require a separate written agreement with WiCell or WARF." Ron Seely, Stein-Cell Pact
Will Give Scientists Easy Access to UW Lines WARF-NIH Agreement Touted as a Commitment to
Widespread Distribution of the Cells, Wis. ST. J., Sep. 6, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL
25524423. According to WARF's spokesman, WARF is "providing the cells for research
purposes. If commercial applications are done, [the users] would have to contact [WARF]. It's a
very complicated process." Nathans, supra note 92. "Profits will come once stem cell research
yields products, drugs, or treatments that can be commercialized, like a treatment to replace the
need for insulin for diabetics, WARF officials have said." Katherine M. Skiba & Marilynn
Marchione, UW Cells Cleared for Research, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 6, 2001, at A01,
available at 2001 WL 27403434. In addition, the agreement requires "other stem-cell providers to
negotiate with the foundation should they enter commercial agreements with university
researchers." Laurie McGinley et al., White House Cuts Estimate of Available Stem Cells, WALL
ST. J.,Sept. 6, 2001, at A2, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2874725. The "specific terms and
conditions and availability must be determined between providers of the cells and the recipients
.... Kim . Coghill, Administration Enters Deal with Owners of Stein Cells, BIOWORLD TODAY,
Sep. 6, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7295637. "Each will have to come to an individual
agreement with" Wisconsin. Nathans, supra note 92. The deal "applies only to governmentemployed scientists, and covers only basic research; if scientists want to use the cells as therapies,
then they will have to renegotiate." Sheryl Gay Stolberg, U.S. Concedes Some Cell Lines Are Not
Ready, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 27395101.
99. "If new drugs or other commercial therapeutics are developed from the research, the
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although not all, academic researchers might feel the same way. For

example, biologist Douglas Melton of Harvard University proclaimed
that WARF/Geron's "conditions would mean that I am the ideal
employee of Geron. They don't pay my salary, they don't pay my bene-

fits, but anything I discover they own."'

°

Additionally, even if aca-

demic researchers decide that they do not mind being pseudoemployees
of WARF/Geron, they will have to find private sources of funding and
isolate all hES cell work from the rest of their laboratory, just as Dr.
Thomson did. The theoretical bases of these problems will be discussed

in Part II.
II.

DOES THE ISSUANCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS TO BROAD UPSTREAM
DISCOVERIES OR INVENTIONS BEST PROMOTE THE SPEED OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS?

ES cells can be thought of as a basic research tool,' 0" an
upstream, 0 pioneering-type discovery, 0 3 or both. Either characterization reveals their importance in future biotechnology research and the
relevance of issuing property rights to them. Although the possibility of
obtaining claims that give broad property rights to such a basic,
upstream, pioneering technology certainly will motivate entrepreneurs to
license owners could stand to gain millions of dollars." Toni Clark, Geron Sued by Researchers
over Stein Cell Rights (on file with author) (Aug. 14, 2001).
100. Stolberg, supra note 93. Dr. Melton has apparently decided to ignore the patent and
derive new stem cells from embryos obtained from a local IVF clinic. Reuters, Harvard Scientist
Pursues New Stein Cell Research (Sep. 5, 2001) (on file with author). He intends to distribute
them to anyone who needs them for research purposes. "They are not being prepared with the
intention of having any rights, commercial or otherwise." NewsRx.com & NewsRx.net, Harvard
University: Fertility Clinic to Give Embryos to Harvard University for Research in Major Deal,
BIOTECH WEEK, Sept. 12, 2001, at 16, available at 2001 WL 17569221. Similarly, Isreali
researchers say "they have begun shipping human embryonic stem cells to outside labs . . .
without permission from" WARF. Dan Vergano, Stem Cells from IsraelAre Sent to HarvardLab,
USA TODAY, Sept. 5, 2001, at 2A. The Israeli lab "says because it is outside the USA and
because its scientist collaborated with the Wisconsin researcher who holds the patent, it doesn't
need the foundation's permission to distribute the lines." Id.
101. Research tools are anything that assist a scientist in discovering a drug or other type of
therapy. A research tool can be thought of as a final product if it is marketable. See Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progressof Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1066-67 (1989).
Alternatively, a research tool may be thought of as an
intermediate step in the process of developing the final product. The "general issue of patents
over research tools has become a very controversial issue." Brenda Sandberg, The Hard Cell: A
Move into the Midwest Gives Heller a Piece of Hot Litigation in the War over Stein Cell Research,
RECORDER, Aug. 23, 2001, at I (quoting patent attorney Lynn Pasahow).
102. See discussion infra Part II.A. 1. (defining upstream and downstream inventions). Arti Rai
defines upstream research as "research that is relatively far removed from a commercial end
product." Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the BioPharmaceuticalhudustry: The
Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 816 (2001).
103. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. (defining pioneering invention).
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innovate, what effect does the existence of such claims have on subsequent innovators? The specific issue that will be addressed by this article is whether WARF's broad upstream patent claims could dissuade

other companies from investing in hES cell research and therapy development.'" 4 At least one study suggests that granting broad claims does
not increase overall research and development or innovative output. °5
When upstream research is controlled by a single firm for the duration of

the patent term, other firms must resort to negotiations in order to work
in the same field.10 6 Negotiations might be unsuccessful for many reasons, a chief one being the superior bargaining power bestowed upon the
patent holder by the patent system. High transaction costs could stifle
07
research. 1

In this scenario, a patent claim covering "basic research materialas opposed to a final product-reduces the commercial incentive to fund
research because the original patent holder could be entitled to anything

from royalty fees to patents covering a new invention or discovery."'0 8
In economic terms, the patent holder is seeking a rent. For example, in
the extreme, rent seeking can take the form of cybersquatting, in which

people who do nothing to deserve a property right can demand large
sums of money to release it. Patents covering genes and hES cells may

be more justifiable, but only slightly so. Dr. Thomson discovered a way
to keep hES cells alive in culture for a year in such a way that they can
be manipulated to transform into many of the mature cells in the human
body. He has not yet shown exactly how these cells can be used or the
104. While it is true that patents are issued to private firms to provide incentives to invest in
expensive research and development, "stem cells are another issue because of the danger that not
enough researchers will have access to the cell lines for all of the scientific possibilities to be fully
explored." Brunts, supra note 94. Moreover, patent applications directed at human embryonic
cells and embryos are dramatically increasing. Amy Outchet, Putting Embryos on the Assembly
Line, UNESCO COuRIER, Apr. I, 2001, at 38. Geron "has filed about 30 new patent applications
for the various techniques and technologies it uses." Associated Press, Seeking Profit in Stein
Cells, WIRED, July 13, 2001, at www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,45232,00.htm. Geron "has
applied for about 40 more patents involving stem cells." Elias, supra note 58.
105. Mariko Sakakibara & Lee Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents hiduce More Innovation?
Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms, 32 RAND. J. ECON. 77,100 (2001),
available at 2001 WL 21701359.
106. See Rai, supra note 102, at 816.
107. Indeed, "[alt least one university has backed out of licensing talks with Geron,
complaining that the company wanted too high a price for access to its stem cells." Neil Munro,
Next Battle in the Stein-Cell War, NAT'L J.,Sept. I, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25926063.
108. Brunts, supra note 94.
A company may receive broad powers over simply retrieving embryonic stein cells
or culturing and guiding them in a particular direction. This is not to suggest that
such feats do not require ingenuity. Yet depending upon the scope of the patent
awarded, we could see a re-run of the same abusive pay-per-view approach taken
with genes.
Outchet, supra note 104.
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best and safest methods for using them. Indeed, it is clear to all scientists that years of research remain before the full potential of hES cellderived therapies will be realized. Dr. Thomson, just like the discoverers of genetic sequences, did some important work to contribute to the
knowledge base, but the question is whether the initial, relatively minimal amount of work he did should entitle him to control future research
and development of hES cells and possible therapies.
These concerns are particularly important in fields that are technologically immature and scientifically unclear. Indeed, it is clear that
while the WARF patents might represent roadblocks to investment, a
similarly important impediment is the simple fact that the scientific principles underlying the use of hES cells are not fully understood.10 9 Now
is the time that scientists should be encouraged to provide insight, effort,
and resources into discovering how hES cells function and can be
manipulated. Scientific research, especially in fields that benefit from
creativity, is a cumulative, synergistic process that relies on the input of
many varied researchers and their corresponding diverse views.
Restricting those views will slow the pace of innovation. Indeed, serendipitous results may amount to breakthroughs. The probability of discovering useful serendipitous results increases with the prevalence of
incentives for researchers to carry out the research. More intellectual
property protection may not help increase the rate of innovation in fields
of inquiry that require imagination.1 10 Part II addresses this issue.
The stifling effect of such broad patent claims is amplified in the
case of hES cells due to the desire of politicians to regulate hES cell
research. Nevertheless, our political system should retain its goals of
providing incentives for the development of therapies. Technologies in
their infancy, such as hES cell research, require support from all direc109. Stein Cells: Potential for Good?, supra note 17.
Mother Nature, more than government money, is the biggest obstacle to stem-cell
therapies. For all the publicity, stem cells are for the most part still stuck in the
laboratory. Getting them to the patient is going to take not only much more research
to demonstrate their safety and efficacy in treating disease, but also considerable
commercial creativity to turn these laboratory marvels into profitable products.
Id.
110. See Comments of Professor Joseph Farell of University of California, Berkeley

Economics Dept. in FTC/DOJ hearings at the Haas School of Business, Feb. 28, 2002 (on file
with author). For example, in the computer industry where it is clear that the goal is the increase
of microprocessor speed, strong intellectual property protection might be appropriate because
allowing a single firm to control the obvious direction of research is more efficient, and the
development is expensive. Conversely, in fields requiring many creative, perhaps sometimes

serendipitous, inputs of lower expense, strong intellectual property rights are more problematic.
Professor Farell also suggests that strong intellectual property rights are problematic in areas with
few alternatives, as is true for ES cell research (that is, there is no other hES cell than that covered
by the WARF patents.)
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tions. Because so little is understood about the scientific principles
underlying hES cells, many diverse viewpoints need to be supported and
heard. Federal funding will provide such incentives. In the absence of
federal funding, the lure of obtaining a patent may provide similar incentives, but the presence of a dominating, all-encompassing patent will
dissuade non-patent holders. The remainder of this Part will begin with
a discussion of policy considerations useful for analyzing whether the
hES cell patent product claims provide the desired incentives for innovation. Parts III and IV will address possible legal means for implementing desirable policy.
This Part begins with the status of hES cell research: can the present technology be characterized as upstream or downstream, as basic or
applied, as a pioneering or governing innovation, or as commercializable
technology? This Part will then turn to an analysis of whether the incentive goals of patent law are served by granting a property right to an
upstream or basic research discovery.
A.

Characterizationof the Invention Described in the WARF Patents
1.

THE PROBLEM OF DISTINGUISHING UPSTREAM OR BASIC
RESEARCH FROM DOWNSTREAM OR APPLIED SCIENCE
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY

In general for the purposes of biotechnology, basic research can be
considered upstream, while applied technology can be considered downstream. It is extremely difficult to distinguish between upstream/basic
research and downstream/applied science in biotechnology.''' In the
biopharmaceutical (biotechnology and pharmaceutical) industry the
crowning achievement typically is a marketable drug. Note, though, that
years of research by a single company, based on decades of work done
by other researchers around the world, involving hundreds of millions of
dollars (just in the final stages) is required to discover and develop the
final product.'2 During this pre-drug phase, because so many different
techniques and chemical and biological compounds are used to develop
the drug, pre-drug discoveries might turn out to be useful as marketable
research tools. Such tools might be sold to other companies or laboratories to help them in their quest to discover drugs. Indeed, there are companies whose business model is to develop only such research tools.
Thus, it becomes very difficult to discern when a biological discovery is
a "final product" or an upstream discovery. For example, "research
identifying a gene linked to a disease might be quite 'upstream' if the
111. See John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural
Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 118-19 (2001).
112. Rai, supra note 102, at 815 n.4.
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commercial goal is a drug therapy. By contrast, if the commercial goal
is a diagnostic test, research identifying the gene might be relatively
'downstream.""'11 Further complicating the issue is the fact that the patenting and commercializing of upstream, basic research is promoted
both by the government'.. and capital markets.' "5In other words, basic
research in such a cumulative field has commercial applications.
Nevertheless, a rough distinction is suggested by Professor Rebecca
Eisenberg. Basic research would include research that "leads down
unexpected paths for which a course cannot be charted in advance, and
[whose] success . . . depends on insights and creativity that may differ
from one investigator to the next."' 1 6 By contrast, applied research
would be research that is "a matter of systematic trial and error, in which
the insights and creativity of individual investigators play little if any
role.""'
Although this distinction may not help define many innovations such as research tools, it can be applied relatively easily to hES
cells. Presently, scientists are at the very beginning of recognizing the
possibilities of the hES cell. The patent holders have not demonstrated
an immediately useful therapeutic use for hES cells, and the only commercial use demonstrated is the sale of human-made unique cell-lines to
other researchers. It is certainly not at a stage consisting of uncreative,
systematic trial and error research. Any application, commercial or not,
remains to be discovered, characterized, and successfully implemented.
It is reasonable to place hES cell research back toward the basicresearch side of the basic research-applied science continuum. At this
stage, the ES cell patents are most appropriately characterized as covering upstream/basic research.
The importance and difficulty of characterizing research as
upstream/basic or downstream/applied is illustrated by two sometimes
113. Id. at 816 n.9 (discussing how basic research may be thought of as "upstream" while the
activities nearer to the final production of a product, for example, a drug, may be thought of as
downstream).
114. See discussion of the Bayh-Dole Act, infra text accompanying notes 118-25.
115. "Modern techniques in biotechnology have 'accelerated the commercial development of
basic research discoveries and attracted commercial interest in academic biomedical research in its
early stages.' Biotechnology firms and academia have formed hundreds of strategic alliances."
Yusing Ko, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, 102 YALE L.J. 777, 794
(1992).
116. Eisenberg, supra note 101, at 1066-67.
user's research tool may be a provider's end product. Some products
in research might also have markets, actual or potential, among
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary
Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 223, 228 (Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
117. Id. at 1067. "[A]
that are currently used
nonresearch consumers."
Research Tools: Is this
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competing patent policies: the Bayh-Dole Act's' 11 promotion of patenting of upstream/basic research discoveries, and the prohibition of patenting products of nature.'"' The Bayh-Dole Act allows recipients of
government funding (generally academic scientists) to patent and license
inventions that were developed using government money. 20 Bayh-Dole

emanated from a cooperative model of research and development
between academia and industry and "epitomized the newfound confi-

dence in strong intellectual property rights as the route to quick and
cheap commercialization."''
The idea was to provide "incentives for
American scientists to assist in the first stages of converting their discoveries to commercial use."' 2
But has Bayh-Dole unwisely promoted the patenting of upstream or

pioneering basic research? Afterall, academic researchers generally
study upstream/basic research subjects. Because of the lack of a control,
it is not possible to clearly discern what Bayh-Dole's impact has been.' 23
Nevertheless, "[o]ne study of academic basic research identified 'intellectual property' as the third major function of the university."' 24 Thus,
whether it is because of Bayh-Dole or not, universities are major participants in the patent system. Moreover, because universities are the home
of basic biomedical research, upstream/basic research is being patented

at a greater rate than ever. 125

118. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2002).
119. See infra Part lll.A.I. for discussion of this doctrine.
120. Tamsen Valoir, Government Funded hIventions: The Bayh-Dole Act and the Hopkins v.
CelIPro March-In Rights Controversy, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 211, 213 (2000). The Act
attempts to increase innovation by "encouraging the participation of small business firms and
promoting the public availability of inventions, yet ensuring that the government obtains sufficient
rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the government and the public." Id.
121. Golden, supra note I 11,at 120.
122. Id. at 121. Other laws passed in this spirit include the Federal Technology Transfer Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (1986) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 37013714 (Supp. II 1998)), and the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462,
98 Stat. 1815 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1994)) (reducing antitrust
enforcement for firms performing collaborative research).
123. There is some data, however. For example, there has been a five-fold increase in industry
funding of university research, and a ten-fold increase in the number of licenses granted by
universities since Bayh Dole's enactment. Valoir, supra note 120, at 234. Moreover, there has
been a four-fold increase in royalties paid to universities between 1981 and 1992, and a doubling
between 1991 and 1995. Id. The "number of university-issued patents increased [ten times since
the passage of Bayh-Dole] from 220 in 1979 to 1148 in 1989 to 3024 in 1998," compared to a
three-fold increase in the number of patents issued to industry over the same period of time. Id.
(citations omitted). There has also been an increase in patent litigation involving universities.
Jennifer Poise, Holding the Sovereign's Universities Accountable for Patent Infringement after
Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, 89 CAL. L. REV. 507, 527 (2001).
124. Clarisa Long, Patents and Cumulative hinovation, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 229, 243

(2000).
125. See supra note 123.

2002]

HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL PATENTS

In contrast, the policy behind prohibiting the patenting of products
of nature supports leaving basic discoveries in the public domain, that is,
not dispensing property rights covering them. This doctrine holds that
something that exists in nature, even if previously unknown to humans,
may not be patented. 126 The wisdom of this doctrine lies in part in the
fact that products of nature often constitute elements of basic biotechnology research. For example, as discussed above, both hES cells and the
method of isolating them constitute upstream/basic research. Decades of
discoveries, innovations, and inventions remain in determining how hES
cells may be utilized. It is impossible to predict how the basic research
will be used to invent and innovate. The product-of-nature prohibition
on patentability strives to avoid impeding development of practical uses
stemming from basic research. In the present environment of encouraging patenting and commercialization of upstream research, the productof-nature doctrine is one mechanism for the PTO and the courts to
"ensure that the gain that comes from spurring private investment is
greater than the loss that results from slowing science or increasing its
cost."' 127 The Bayh-Dole Act and the product-of-nature doctrine illustrate the difficulty the legal system faces when characterizing discoveries as upstream or downstream and deciding how to best promote
subsequent development of upstream discoveries and innovation of
downstream discoveries.
2.

THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINING WHAT

Is

A "PIONEERING"

INVENTION AND WHAT IS AN "IMPROVEMENT"

It is also useful to analyze patents on the basis of whether the
invention described is "pioneering" with respect to the field, or is an
"improvement" of a pioneering invention. These terms typically are not
directly important for the PTO in determining whether a patent claim
should be issued, but they do help in trying to understand the implications of the issuance of a patent claim on subsequent development . 28
This article argues that it is unwise to give property rights to pioneering
inventions that are too undeveloped, when the crucial technological
advances are improvements.
According to the Supreme Court, a pioneer patent is "a patent covering a function never before performed, a wholly novel device, or one
of such novelty and importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress
126. See discussion infra Part III.
127. Golden, supra note 111, at 164-65 (citations omitted).
128. Additionally, they sometimes play a role in infringement cases; a court may overlook
infringement of a claim if the infringing invention is pioneering. Westinghouse v. Boyden PowerBrake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561-62 (1898); see also infra Part III.A.4 (discussing the reverse
doctrine of equivalents).
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of the art, as distinguished from a mere improvement or perfection of
what had gone before."'' 29 But what exactly is a "distinct step in the
progress of the art"? What is a "mere improvement"? Distinguishing
between the two-and determining which is more important-is especially difficult in fields of cumulative development. This debate goes
back to at least the I 850s. For example, the designer of the Great Western Railway and the Great Eastern steamship stated that "the most useful
inventions and improvements . . . are mere progressive steps in a highly
wrought and highly advanced system suggested by, and dependent on,
other previous steps, their whole value and the means of their application probably dependent on the success of some or many other inventions."' 3 0 This is an apt description of the biopharmaceutical field.
It might seem appropriate to take into account the economic impact
of an invention when attempting to characterize it as a pioneering or
improvement invention, but the commercial, practical, or social ramifications of the invention theoretically are not considered when determining its pioneer status.' 3 ' Instead, the courts simply apply standard patent
analysis to determine how different the invention is from the prior art.' 32
"Courts have considered an invention to be a pioneer when it presents a
'broad breakthrough,' 'major advance,' or 'basic operational concept';
or is 'broadly new' or 'devoid of significant prior art.'" 3 3 It is probably
34
wise for the courts to attempt to avoid looking at commercial success.
Commercial success does not necessarily equate with pioneering status.
For example, some truly pioneering inventions may not be suitable for
marketing, whereas a minor improvement may result in commercialization. In fact, commercial success is probably more attributable to
improvements. Put another way, a likely scenario is the following: a
pioneering invention is not marketable as it represents the earliest stage
129. Id. The genesis of the pioneer invention doctrine is found in Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356
(1822). See also Morley Sewing Mach. Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263 (1889) (discussing the use
of the pioneer invention doctrine in an infringement case).
130. HENRY PETROSKI, THE EVOLUTION OF USEFUL THINGS 45 (1992). This inventor
concluded that the patent system obstructs progress because "'really good improvements are not
the result of inspiration,' but 'more or less the results of an observing mind, brought to bear upon
circumstances as they arise ....[and because] ... 'most good things are being thought of by many
persons at the same time.'" Id.
131. John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 35, 48-49 (1995).
132. The "sole index of pioneer status . .. is the position occupied by the invention in its
technological field." Id. "For an invention to be considered a pioneer ... it must meet what
amounts to a test of extraordinary nonobviousness." Id.
133. Id. (citations omitted).
134. This may be unavoidable; commercial concerns are often disguised as obviousness
questions -(pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 103) such as the secondary considerations of Graham v. John
Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966), including, for example, whether there is a need for the invention or
whether others had failed at achieving it. Id. at 17-18.
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of development; subsequent small improvements add to the invention
making it more easily used by consumers and thus more economically
valuable; a subsequent "radical improvement"'' 35 may render the invention altogether different, and thus might actually qualify as a pioneering
invention. This scenario illustrates the difficulty of characterizing
inventions in cumulative fields, especially when attempting to do so
using commercial success or marketability as a metric.
Just as the invention described in the hES cell patents is most
appropriately described as basic research, it also may be characterized as
a pioneering invention. First, culturing the cells in such a way that they
retain their ability to transform into mature cells was a "function never
before performed,... one of such novelty and importance as to mark a
distinct step in the progress of the art."' 3 6 Second, standing by itself, the
culturing technique is only commercially viable to the extent that it can
be licensed to other laboratories; to develop into a marketable therapy,
the patented invention needs "improvements." The quickest way to
commercialize the technology will be to make and sell unique hES celllines-a downstream invention. In fact, WARF did this and is charging
$5,000 for a sample of a cell-line.' 3 7 However, this improvement is not
what was patented; rather, WARF patented all hES cells. Another
downstream commercial application or improvement will be the use of
the method of isolating and culturing the ES cells as part of a process of
generating organs and tissues. Again, WARF did not patent this application. WARF patented its culturing method, a necessary stepping stone
to both inventions; neither can be performed without invading the territory covered by the WARF claims. Any improvements will build on
WARF's pioneering claims.
Considering both of these examples of downstream innovations, it
becomes clear that the WARF claims represent a pioneering invention.
The scientific community correctly lauds the technological leap made by
Dr. Thomson. However, just because an improvement invention is
made possible by an important pioneering scientific advance does not
mean the pioneering inventor should obtain the right to exclude all
future innovators from developing the technology. The following section addresses this issue.
135. "A radical-as opposed to 'ordinary'-improver builds on a pioneer's contribution, but
in a very significant way: The improvement is the source of very high profits, as opposed to the
pioneer's substantial but much lower profits." Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights &
Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 79 (1994). Again, it
seems that economic considerations enter into the analysis when attempting to define the
invention, even though courts attempt to avoid this.
136. Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 561-62 (1898).
137. Nathans, supra note 92.
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Should Strong Property Rights Be Grantedfor Pioneering,
Upstream, or Basic Research Biotechnology Discoveries?
SHOULD THE PIONEER BE FAVORED BY THE PATENT SYSTEM IN
THE RACE TO COMMERCIALIZE?

Why does the patent system award broad property rights covering
not yet fully commercializable upstream pioneering inventions, as it did
for the hES cell discovery? Some economic theorists support granting
strong property rights to a pioneer inventor. For example, Edmund
Kitch set forth his prospecting theory,' 38 which holds that a patent system promotes efficient development of technologies only if it tends to
assure efficient allocation of the resources among the prospects at an
efficient rate and in an efficient amount, that management of each prospect is in the hands of the entity best equipped to manage it, and that
information found by one entity is communicated to other firms at an
39
efficient rate. 1
The patent system, according to Kitch, exists to promote proper
exploitation of an invention. Under the prospect theory, pioneer patents
are desirable because they allow a single firm to control and coordinate
the development of the invention. For this to be true, that firm must be
able to recognize and support all possible desirable developments.
Additionally, transaction costs for bargaining with other firms must be
minimal.
Kitch argued that the practice of granting broad patent claims long
before the invention is commercially viable supports his theory. 4 ° This
is particularly true in the context of biopharmaceutical patents where a
patentee need only demonstrate a single use to receive a property right
covering all uses.' 4 ' In other words, because so much development
remains after the initial discovery of a pharmaceutical compound (for
example, clinical trials), the patent permits the coordinated and efficient
development of the product.
Joseph Schumpeter also focused on the development-what he
called "innovation"-of the invention after its initial discovery. 4 ' His
notion that the invention prior to development results in "no economi138. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature & Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265
(1977). A prospect is "a particular opportunity to develop a known technological possibility." Id.
at 266. This prospect theory is contrasted with the "reward theory" which holds that patents exist
to compensate and reward the inventor for his investment in the creation. Id.
139. Id. at 266.
140. Id. at 267-68.
141. Id. at 269. Kitch points out that this does not conform to the traditional incentive theory
of patent law.
142. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES 84 (1939); see also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, & DEMOCRACY 81-110 (3d ed. 1950).
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cally relevant effect at all" seems particularly prescient when considering to the hES cell patents. 4 3 However, Schumpeter used this insight to
maintain that such inventors need patent protection in order to innovate."' Underlying this conclusion is the premise that a single coordinating firm is more suited to innovating than many independent freely
contracting firms.
In practice, it is obvious why parties desire broad patent claims.
First, the expense of applying for a patent must be justified by the value
of the patent. Second, more intellectual property is awarded to a patentee by broader claims. This allows such a patentee to force others out of
the field or to license from the patent holder the technology covered by
the claims. The ability to obtain broad patent claims will have strong
implications for the success of the company that holds the patent, while
it may harm other companies.
2.

PIONEER PATENTS MAY DISCOURAGE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES,
14 5
ESPECIALLY IN CUMULATIVE INDUSTRIES

Private property, including intellectual property, is essential to
our way of life .... But reducing too much to private property can be
bad medicine. Private land, for instance, is far more useful if separated from other private land by public streets, roads, and highways.
Public parks, utility rights-of-way, and sewers reduce the amount of
land in private hands, but vastly enhance the value of the property
that remains. So too is it with intellectual property. Overprotecting
intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is
impossible without a rich public domain .... Culture, like science
and technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the
works of those who came earlier. Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it is supposed to nurture. 146
The very word "pioneer" suggests that a pioneering invention is
much more valuable to society, or at least is a greater contribution to
science and technology, than are subsequent additions, alterations, or
"mere improvements" to the pioneer invention. Nevertheless, the patent
system must not lose sight of the importance of improvement innovations. Rewarding pioneering inventors to the detriment of improvers is a
143. See supra note 142.
144. Id.
145. See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research & the Patent Law, 5 J. EcON. PERSP. 29 (1991); Rai, supra note 102; see also A.R.
CHAPMAN, PERSPECTIVES ON GENETIC PATENTING: RELIGION, SCIENCE, & INDUSTRY IN DIALOGUE

(1999).
146. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer & the Genome Project: Problems with
Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK 163, 175 (1994) (quoting Judge Alex Kozinski in Vanna White
v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (dissenting)).
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dangerous policy. It is important not to remove incentives that
encourage subsequent researchers from contributing improvements. The
theories of Kitch and Shumpeter overlooked the benefits of situations
where more is gained from allowing other inventors to play a role in
innovating and commercializing the pioneering invention.
First, these theories neglect the fact that all inventions, even pioneering ones, owe some acknowledgment to prior discoveries and inventions. 4 7 Second, although pioneer inventions may be technologically or
creatively impressive, it may be the improvements that are commercially
successful. 4 ' Third, patents may result in wasted resources. Competitors likely will expend time and money to "invent around" the patent
claims. The contribution to society may merely be a redundant invention. "49
' Fourth, while patents are important inducements to innovate,
awarding broad property rights to a single firm may not be the best way
to promote competition, which otherwise would increase the rate of
innovation. As one economist found, "a market structure intermediate
between monopoly and perfect competition would promote the highest
rate of inventive activity."' 5 ° Thus, to speed up the pace of innovation,
it may be important to provide some patent protection, but not extreme
protection. Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, issuing patents to
upstream, pioneering inventions in unpredictable, creative fields may
stand in the way of progress because such unpredictable fields rely on
the cumulative inputs and improvements contributed by other researchers. 5' Because it is highly unlikely that a single patent holder will be
147. Inventing is a "continuous process ....
in which the past is very much linked with the
future . . inventors built on the work of inventors who have come before." Edmund W. Kitch,
Elementarv & Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of hitellectual Property, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1727, 1739 (2000).
148. "[l]mprovements in many cases dwarf the original work in terms of their practical
significance." Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEx. L. REv. 989, 997 (1997).
149. Ko, supra note 115, at 792-93.
150. MORTON I. KAMIEN & NANCY L. SCHWARTZ, MARKET STRUCTURE & INNOVATION 104
(1982). "[T]he optimal magnitude of the innovation will be the largest when the exogenous threat
of entry is intermediate between no chance or rival entry and virtually certain rival entry." Id. at
132 (citing R.R. DeBondt, hinovative Activity & Barriers to Entry, EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 10, 95109 (1977)). "[M]arket structure influences the speed with which transient quasi-rents are eroded
away by imitators." RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTLR, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
ECONOMIC CHANCE 280 (1982).
151. Ko, supra note 115, at 792. "The argument for independence among researchers makes
more sense if research leads down unexpected paths for which a course cannot be charted in
advance, and if the success of research projects depends on insights and creativity that may differ
from one investigator to the next." Eisenberg, supra note 101, at 1066-67.
At their worst, [patents] can create obstacles to subsequent [research and
development] and add to a thicket of rights that firms must negotiate their way past
before they can get their products on the market. Patent protection is most likely to
be an effective device for achieving technology transfer in the case of a patent that
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suited ideally to identify future improvements, many diverse inventors
52
should be encouraged to contribute to the development of the field.1
Such diversity is important because it is difficult to predict future uses of
a pioneering technology, and even if such uses are predictable, the pioneering firm might not be the most competent at developing the
technology.
The difficulty in expecting a single firm to control and direct innovation efficiently is likely even more prevalent in the biopharmaceutical
field. It is true that in some industries coordination may be optimal. For
example, in the field of computer electronics, it may be desirable for
firms to coordinate to develop an industry standard such as a
microprocessor on which many software companies can base their products. In contrast, the biopharmaceutical field is very different. Biomedical researchers do not develop standards so much as discover principles
of nature and manipulate them for human use. While it may make sense
for a single pharmaceutical firm to coordinate the development of a single compound for a single treatment of a disease, it would be better if
multiple companies were involved if that compound has other uses,
unanticipated by the first firm. Otherwise those uses will take longer to
discover and develop.' 5 3 In these circumstances, it is in society's best
interest to allow many other firms the opportunity to seek out new uses
for the compound. The benefits of efficient coordination for the development of one use are outweighed by the desire to avoid loss of other
uses. Additionally, even if other firms do manage to find new uses, the
transaction costs to license the invention from the patent holder must be
low enough to encourage the other firms to develop the new uses.
This article does not argue that efficient or beneficial bargains
covers an end product for sale to consumers. It is least likely to be effective and
most likely to interfere with subsequent research and product development in the
case of a patent on a research tool that is to be used in subsequent stages of
[research and development], but will not be incorporated into the end product as it is
ultimately sold.
Eisenberg, supra note 146, at 168.
152. See Lemley, supra note 148, at 1049.
153. Golden, supra note I 11, at 166-67.
The unpredictability of biotechnological development makes the coordination of
subsequent invention implausible; allowing multiple firms to pursue a variety of
commercial "spin-offs" seems a better strategy. Furthermore, because the granting
of broad biotechnology patents tends to lead firms to engage in only "cosmetic
differentiation," pioneer biotechnology patents appear unlikely to produce the kind
of functional specialization that might create true "economics of coordination."
Thus, in the context of modern biotechnology, any benefits from a "pioneer patent"
are most probably outweighed by the costs of chilling invention and enabling
licensing "hold-outs" that slow technological progress.
Id. (internal citations omitted).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:157

never take place in the biopharmaceutical industry. Instead, it suggests
that for optimal exploitation of an invention in the presence of a property
right giving one firm market power, bargaining costs must be minimal.
Indeed, under the ideal conditions assumed by Coasian theory,' 5 4 issuing
broad property rights to a pioneer is not a problem because a pioneer
patent holder and an improvement patent holder (that is, the holders of
"blocking patents") will bargain to an efficient outcome. Both parties
have incentives to reach a deal as long as the improvement will increase

the commercial success of the pioneer invention. In practice, however,
such bargains may be difficult to achieve.' 55 First, it may be difficult to
value the inventive contributions made by the pioneer and subsequent
inventors, especially in fields that require much development before
commercialization.' 56 Second, transaction costs could be high when a
57
pioneer or improver has a false sense of the value of its contribution.

Third, a pioneer may simply fail to see how its invention may be
improved.' 58 Finally, there may be "irrational" reasons for the inability
to strike a deal, such as "spite, pride, and anger."' 5 9 Thus, the initial
distribution of property rights can alter the bargaining parties' equilibrium level of output.' 6 1 In such a situation, a court should intervene to

promote a bargain.
A better solution would be to bestow on an early pioneer inventor

only a narrow property right or no property right at all. 16

Failures in

licensing are especially dangerous when the patent protection in question covers a pioneering or upstream invention.' 62 This is because when
transaction costs are too high, the incentive-to-innovate goals of the pat-

ent system break down. A patent is not meant to close off subsequent
154. See RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, & THE LAW (1988); see also Ronald H.

Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
155. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 874 n.146 (1990).

156. Especially early in the development of a biopharmaceutical product "there is immense
uncertainty over the technology's future development path and profitability," thus making it
difficult to value innovations. Merges, supra note 135, at 75.
157. "[l]ndirect evidence suggests that the transfer of major improvements increases
[transaction] costs." Ko, supra note 115, at 781.
158. See Merges, supra note 135, at 89.
159. Id. at 90.
160. Ko, supra note 115, at 781.
161. Because "efficient licensing will not always occur, intellectual property law must do more
than determine that someone owns a particular intellectual property right: it must give some
thought to who ought to own that right." Lemley, supra note 148, at 1061.
162. Such failures "will impede improvement in subsequent generations. The more absolute
the property right given to original . . . inventors, the more critical efficient licensing is to
subsequent innovation, and the more sensitive the industry is to market failures in licensing." Id.
at 998-99.
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innovation, but to reward an inventor for her investment. The licensing
problem is amplified in the case of upstream patents.
What are the practical effects of patents in the biopharmaceutical
industry? In general, a system has developed in which large, capitalintensive pharmaceutical companies coexist with small, capital-seeking
biotechnology firms. The large companies clearly have marketing
power, while the small firms may be subject to the whims of the capital
markets.' 6 3 Small companies depend on ownership of valuable patents
for survival. However, broad patents are available to large pharmaceutical companies as well. The question is not whether broad patents are
good for small biotechnology companies, but whether this system promotes frictionless Coasian bargaining. If so, the Coase theorem holds
that it does not matter who gets the initial property right, or, by extension, how big it is. But since there is friction in practice, one should
worry about who gets the initial property right and what happens after
property rights are allocated.' 64 For example, there could be holdup
problems.' 65 Eisenberg has provided empirical, if anecdotal, evidence
for high transaction costs: "[p]rivate firms-both large, established
pharmaceutical firms and small, young biotechnology companies-also
report growing frustration with the administrative burden of renegotiating the terms of the agreements for the transfer of research tools and
with attendant delays in research."' 6 6 She concluded that "initial allocations of intellectual property rights matter . . . because they either promote or retard the efficient dissemination of prior discoveries to
163. See generally Josh Lerner & Robert P. Merges, The Control of Strategic Alliances: An
Empirical Analysis of Biotechnology Collaborations,Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 6014, 1997, (finding that the bargaining power of small biotechnology firms was
dependent on their access to capital markets), available at http:l/papers.nber.org/papers/w6014.
164. See Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of
Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY
FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 123 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); see also Josh
Lerner, The Patent System & Competition, Public Comment to the FTC & DOJ (2002), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/lemerjosh.pdf.
165. Thus if property "rights are held by parties who will not undergo repeat interactions...
[a] one-shot bargaining game results, where some party must assemble disparate rights to move
forward with a valuable economic project. This is a setting ripe for holdups and bargaining
breakdown, as the economic literature has long recognized." Merges, supra note 164, at 128.
166. Eisenberg, supra note 117, at 225. Professor Eisenberg also notes that
there seems to be a widely-shared perception that negotiations over the transfer of
proprietary research tools present a considerable and growing obstacle to progress in
biomedical research and product development. Scientists report having to wait

months or even years to carry out experiments while their institutions attempt to
renegotiate the terms of "Material Transfer Agreements," ...
database access
agreements, and patent license agreements. University technology transfer
professionals report that agreements presented for the transfer of research tools
impose increasingly onerous terms.
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subsequent innovators." 167

This transaction-cost problem is not only bad for the
biopharmaceutical industry, but has social consequences as well. 68 An
example is genetic tests. One study found that, due to fears of an
infringement lawsuit, twenty-six percent of genetic testing labs stopped
offering a test after a patent on the test issued.' 69 Researchers believe
the patents could reduce the quality of the genetic testing because the
various labs will not be able to experiment with the testing and exchange
data, and there will be fewer labs adding to the accumulation of knowledge.' 7 ° Similarly, the presence of corporate relationships and ensuing
patents has been cited as promoting an increased lack of sharing data
and research products in academia.' 17 Interestingly, biopharmaceutical
firms themselves have recognized these problems and have come up
with a solution: they have attempted to preclude the possibility of
obtaining some patents by freely dispensing some of their discoveries,
172
thus creating patent-killing prior art.
Moreover, the problem could be exacerbated if there are multiple
pioneer patent holders who hold overlapping property rights. 73 This
problem has been termed the "tragedy of the anticommons,"'' 74 meaning
that if a party must deal with multiple patent holders to develop a single
invention, the probability of that innovation occurring is reduced. An
167. Id. at 226.
168. Id. at 233.
Even from the perspective of large, private firms, the value of foregone exchanges
due to failed bargains over the transfer of research tools is often more than trivial.
For example, a former scientist who now represents a major pharmaceutical firm in
research tool negotiations indicated that, even when her firm is willing to pay
$20,000 for a license to a research tool, negotiations over contract language can take
months or years, during which time the scientists often give up and turn their
attention to something else.
Id. "A representative of another pharmaceutical firm explained that 'the deal breaker [in
negotiations over the transfer of research tools] typically isn't cost, but terms and conditions.' The
terms and conditions that are so difficult to agree upon generally involve the allocation of
speculative future value and risks." Id.
169. Alison Motluk, Scientists Hindered by Gene Patent,415 NATURE 577 (2002). The patent
owner "wrote to labs offering to grant sublicenses for fees ranging from $25,000 to $250,000, plus
royalties of $20 per test." Id.
170. This problem could cover testing for many genes such as those involved in hereditary
heamochromatosis, Alzheimer's Disease, breast cancer, and Fragile X syndrome. Id.
171. "[Clorporate involvement in academia has transformed from almost nothing two decades
ago to a booming business today with, for example, Merck setting up a $15 million deal with MIT
that gives the company certain patent and licensing rights on joint discoveries over the next five
years." Nicholas Thompson, Scientists Say Sharing of Key Data Has Slowed, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 5, 2002, at C .
172. This is especially true in the field of DNA sequencing. See Rai, supra note 102, at 825.
173. See Merges, supra note 164, at 128.
174. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticonnons in Bionedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).
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example is attempting to use the sequence of a gene in a therapy. If the
PTO has issued patents for several fragments of that gene under its
Expressed Sequence Tag (EST) policy,' 75 then the developer of the therapy would have to bargain with each EST patent holder. One also can
envision similar problems arising out of the hES cell patent. Because
the technology is in such an early stage of development, it is likely that
in an effort to put it to use, scientists will combine it with other technologies. If each of these technologies is covered by broad upstream patents, the innovator of the final product will have to bargain with each of
those patent owners. Obviously, the upstream patent holders will be in a
strong bargaining position. Additionally, it is likely that downstream
innovators will be reluctant to develop uses because of the presence of
76
the upstream patents unless bargains can be achieved ex ante.1

3.

PIONEER PATENTS MAY DISCOURAGE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
SMALL BIOTECHNOLOGY FIRM MODEL

17 7

A wealth of small biotechnology firms sprouted in the San Francisco Bay Area (and ultimately internationally) after the founding of
Genentech178 in 1976. Biotechnology companies complement industry
(agricultural and pharmaceutical) and academia by providing a third
option for scientists to perform research and development, as well as a
different vehicle for venture capital investment. The biotechnology
industry is infused with the same entrepreneurial philosophy that helped
79
create it. 1
Biotechnology companies operate using very different business
models than those used by large pharmaceutical companies. Only a
small fraction of biotechnology companies are likely to produce a mar175. See infra note 233.
176. Although the owners of the patent claim to deal with any problems through licensing,
"three structural concerns caution against uncritical reliance on markets and norms to avoid a
biomedical anticommons tragedy: the transaction costs of rearranging entitlements, heterogeneous
interests of owners, and cognitive biases among researchers." Heller & Eisenberg, supra note
174, at 700.
177. See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Connons: hnpetfect Patent
Protection & the Network Model of Innovation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 987 (2000); see also PETER
S. COHAN, THE TECHNOLOGY LEADERS: How AMERICAS' MOST PROFITABLE HIGH-TECH
COMPANIES INNOVATE THEIR WAY TO SUCCESS

73 (1997); D.

Jane

Bower & Erica Whittaker,

Client Communication & hInovative Efficiency in US & UK Biotechnology Companies, in
TECHNOLOGY-BASED FIRMS IN THE

NEW

1990s 36, 40 (Ray Oakey ed., 1994).

178. See, e.g., Genentech Inc. fact sheet, http://www.gene.com/gene/25years/factsheetbiotech.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2002).
179. "In marked contrast with most research universities and pharmaceutical companies,
biotechnology firms are mostly young, small, and privately held." Golden, supra note 11l, at 117

(citations omitted).
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ketable product within a reasonable time. 8 ' Instead, most biotechnology firms contribute innovative research tools,' 8 ' technology
development, and cutting-edge ideas on possible future drug development to larger companies, or develop these innovations in joint ventures

with larger companies.18 2 Instead of relying solely on large in-house
corporate laboratories to perform basic research, large pharmaceutical
companies increasingly have established partnerships with small firms
and collaborations with universities,' 83 due to their innovative creativity,' 8 4 while small firms need resources contributed by large companies.
In addition, large companies have struck deals with small biotechnology

firms to spread risk.' 85
This entrepreneurial collaborative system is more efficient at

advancing the rate of discovery and development of biotechnology innovations, especially in unpredictable fields. "[T]raditional pharmaceutical companies, despite their superior innovative resources, lag far behind
the small start-up companies in contributing to biotechnological innovations."' 86 Although there are many possibilities, one explanation for the
87
advantage of small firms is their lack of bureaucratic restraints.

Regardless of the explanation, it is clear that it is not in society's best
interest to give any firm controlling status in unpredictable fields.
Some argue that small biotechnology companies are successful
180. Id.
181. "The evolving profit strategies of biotechnology firms often depend heavily on
intellectual property rights in discoveries that are primarily inputs into further research.
Eisenberg, supra note 117, at 227.
182. Frequently, their primary assets are knowledge, -ideas, trained personnel, and
patents. Before they develop a commercial product, they naturally seek financing
through joint development projects with larger firms such as pharmaceutical
companies, in which they trade intellectual property and technical expertise from
cash and business savvy. The resulting cooperative structure of the biotechnology
industry is well documented: in the mid-1990s, 81.8% of the United States
biotechnology companies had a drug company research partner, 70.5% had a
university research partner, 50% had a fellow biotechnology research partner, and
47.7% had a research institute research partner.
Golden, supra note I11, at 118-19 (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 122 (citations omitted). "Indeed, the biotechnology industry-dominated by small,
young firms that rely for their continued existence on a complex network of collaborative research
relationships-emerged in the 1990s as perhaps the leading exemplar of the cooperative approach
to innovation through 'entrepreneurial science."' Id. (citations omitted).
184. See Lerner & Merges, supra note 163; see also Barnett, supra note 177, at 1007.
185. Golden, supra note I ll, at 122.
186. Ko, supra note 115, at 800.
187. See NELSON & WINTER, supra note 150, at 279. A large firm's "hierarchical structure and
culture may be inimical to innovation, or at least inimical to radical innovation . . . [and]
[i]nnovation incentives may . . . be weak in a large firm because it is difficult to design
compensation schemes that accurately reflect responsibility for innovative inputs." Rai, supra
note 102, at 825.
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because they are protected by patents containing broad claims.' 8 8 It is
true that, in the short term, patent protection is desirable from the biotechnology company's perspective because it gives a small firm strong
bargaining power. In the long term, though, the existence of broad,
upstream patents held by other firms both discourages small companies
from entering the research field and increases the burden on already
existing firms, thus circling back to the problem of concentrating power
in a few firms.' 8 9 While a patent attorney will vigorously argue for the
importance of broad patent protection for his firm, he will also complain
about the existence of other patents' 9 °: patents that siphon off money
from the company via licenses or threatened litigation, or patents that
may put the biotechnology company out of business. Such patent system-created "monopolies could distort the direction of research and
eventually clog the 'small company' dynamism of the biotechnology
industry itself, leading ultimately to its domination by giant companies
with large concentrations of vested intellectual property rights, a situation that has arisen in the separate but related field of agricultural
biotechnology." 19 1
Thus, in practice, broad patent claims covering upstream or pioneering inventions do not always promote the flourishing of the biotechnology industry.' 92 Although a pioneer patent is surely valuable to a
small biotechnology firm, such a patent may adversely affect other small
firms. Additionally, there is nothing to stop a large pharmaceutical firm
from obtaining such a patent and using it to the detriment of small firms.
By concentrating power in a single entity, as described in Kitch's prospect theory, pioneer patents very well may be detrimental to the biotechnology industry.

188. Ko, supra note 115, at 800. Rather, the primary attraction of patents to biotechnology
firms is placed elsewhere: "patent law facilitates innovation not so much by 'spurring' invention
as by 'enabling' it, by providing small biotechnology firms, which are the heart of the American
biotechnology industry, with an intermediate 'product'-patents-that they can use to attract
investment." Golden, supra note I 1, at I11.
189. See Barnett, supra note 177, at 1022.
190. See comments of immunex Corporation's Vice President, Michael K. Kirschner, at FTC/
DOJ hearings, Feb. 26, 2002, at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/index.htm.
191. Golden, supra note I 11, at 172 (citations omitted). The "recent trend toward mergers and

consolidation in human and animal biotechnology may be cause for incipient alarm." Id. There
are currently about 1300 biotechnology firms. G. Steven McMillan et al., An Analysis of the
Critical Role of Public Science in Innovation: The Case of Biotechnology, 29 REs. POL'Y 1, 2
(2000). See Antonio Regalado, The Great Gene Grab, Sept.-Oct. 2000, TECH. REv., at 48, 50.
"[l]f in keeping with Kitch's theory, upstream patent rights are extremely broad, such that only a
few vertically integrated firms exist, vertical integration considerably narrows the number of
different research avenues that are likely to be pursued." Rai, supra note 102, at 835.
192. See Golden, supra note 11l, at 167.
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MANY BIOTECHNOLOGY PIONEER INVENTIONS LIKELY WOULD
HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED IN THE ABSENCE OF PATENT
LAW'S INCENTIVES

The patent system is designed to provide incentives to inventors to
make investments of time and money worthwhile. In a very real sense,
then, inventions that would exist in the absence of the patent system
should not be covered by patent protection. In this regard, a distinction
can be made between upstream and downstream research. Upstream,
basic research may occur in the absence of patents, especially if it is
already occurring in academic laboratories. Indeed, federal funding, not
the patent system, generally provides the incentive in such situations. In
contrast, improvement research, much of which is aimed at commercialization of the pioneering invention, likely requires patent incentives.
Many academic laboratories are not interested in completing the details
of an invention for commercialization purposes. Instead, they are interested in uncovering novel principles and discoveries of science and technology. This provides another reason to take care in issuing patents
covering upstream, pioneering inventions. Private firms, which generally commercialize upstream discoveries with downstream improvements, must not be impeded by pioneer patents covering the upstream
discoveries.
For example, academic scientists, who have driven the revolutionary advances in biomedical science, are not generally motivated by the
possibility of obtaining patents. Instead, they seek publication and the
esteem of their peers.' 93 Indeed, much biotechnology upstream, basic
research would take place in the absence of the patent system.' 9 4 This is
probably true for many pioneering inventions and certainly would have
been true for hES cells (in the absence of the government's reluctance to
fund this research), whose existence has been known for a long time. 195
Scientists have been struggling for decades to isolate other types of stem
cells, such as adult blood and neural stem cells.' 9 6 Nevertheless, patent
193. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 182 (1987); Robert K. Merton, The Normative Structure of Science,
in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 270 (1973); Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research:
Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77 (1999).
194. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
The ripeness-of-time concept of invention, developed from the study of the many
independent multiple discoveries in history, predicts that if a particular individual
had not made a particular discovery others would have, and in probably a relatively
short period of time. If something is to be discovered at all, very likely it will be
discovered by more than one person.

Id. at 490 (citations omitted).
195. Stein Cells: Potential for Good?, supra note 17.
196. See Ruthann Richter, Stein Cell Pursuits, 19 STAN. MED. 11 (2002).
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protection likely is a motivating factor for many inventors of improvements. For example, academic laboratories are not going to spend the
time and money to guide a therapy through Food and Drug Administra-

tion (FDA) trials.
It thus seems important to distinguish between the two types of
inventions before a patent is awarded. Because of the difficulty in determining what is an upstream or pioneer invention, however, a better solu-

tion may be to issue patents -whose claims are coextensive in scope with
the invention, that is, a narrow patent.'9 7 If this model had been applied
to the hES cell patent applications, WARF would have ended up with
patent protection covering the method of culturing the hES cells, and
product claims to the unique cell-lines made by Dr. Thomson. WARF
would not own claims to all freshly purified hES cells.
III.

A

SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM CREATED BY THE ISSUANCE OF
THE

HES

CELL PATENT PRODUCT CLAIMS

How can the market distortions created by the overly broad ES cell
patents (and exacerbated by President Bush's decision) be ameliorated?
I propose that the best solution is to turn to existing patent doctrines to
assess the validity of the WARF patents.' 9 8 Additionally, in the future
this general analysis should be more strictly applied to other types of
upstream inventions. In a general sense, because the costs of misallocation of a property right could be large, there should be a presumption
against the issuance of broad, upstream, pioneer-type patents, especially
those covering purifications of products of nature. While the patent system is not legally in a position to distinguish between pioneer and
improvement inventions as long as both rise above the patentability
threshold,' 9 9 the scope of the patent can be tailored during prosecution
of the patent or afterward during litigation. Moreover, such claims (as
the hES cell patent product claims) may be invalidated by the courts2 0 if
197. "Although basic research conducted in universities can never completely substitute for
industrial inventions, narrowing patent scope for biotechnology makes sense, because alternatives
to financial reward may be sufficient to stimulate inventions." Ko, supra note 115, at 794. Also
note the "technological resignation" view: "although the patent system indeed has an impact upon
the progress of individual inventions, the advance of technology is an inevitable societal force in
which the scheme of patents can play only a marginal role." Thomas, supra note 131, at 39.
198. Congress might also consider the possibility of invalidating the patent or requiring
compulsory licensing in view of the implications of President Bush's decision. In the absence of
federal funding, we must be especially careful how we allocate property rights to these
technologies. See infra note 205.
199. "It is not enough to say that intellectual property law favors 'creators'-for here we have
creators on both sides of the equation, and the law must choose between them." Lemley, supra
note 148, at 998.
200. See infra Part III.A. (discussing several grounds of invalidation).
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they survive the PTO's examination process and their scope cannot be
narrowed.
The courts and the PTO should pay closer attention to maintaining
strict standards of patentability for upstream or pioneering inventions.
The patent system has guided the assessment of the patentability of
upstream research in prior, similar situations. For example, in recognizing that "overprotection of algorithms may stifle innovation by raising
the costs of subsequent innovation," '' the PTO clarified its position on
patenting software in a statement of guidelines, which states that "mathematical algorithms are, as such, unpatentable, but that applications of
such algorithms may be protectible as new processes." ' 2 The PTO
responded similarly to a recent perceived crisis concerning patents of
DNA sequences.2 03 The PTO should demonstrate the same concern to
the case of the ES cell patents and future applications for claims to
freshly purified cells. Federal funding, not the patent system, should
provide the incentives for uncovering these upstream discoveries. But
regardless of federal funding, the patent system should not provide
overly broad property rights to them.
If patent protection is too broad, there are two possible ways of
dealing with this problem through a shift in patentability doctrine at the
level of patent prosecution. First, the requirements of patentability, such
as new invention, utility, enablement, and written description, could be
more rigorously applied by the PTO. Second, new categorical rules
could be developed, proscribing the patenting of certain types of substances; in this case, cells removed from a human body. The courts
could also develop these standards in patent litigation by invalidating
claims that do not strictly adhere to the patent doctrines. In contrast to
such a doctrinal shift, the courts could construe the claims' scope narrowly through litigation.2" 4 Additionally, the courts could more readily
allow infringement of such claims. For example, the reverse doctrine of
equivalents may be applied to excuse infringement by improvement
inventions.2 05
201. Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of
Intellectual Property, 5 J. EcON. PERSP. 3, 9-10 (1991). The PTO's new guidelines were

prompted by "[rieports in 1988 and 1989 that the [PTO] had adopted a more liberal approach to
software patent applications, which might result in granting patent protection to fundamental
building blocks of research." Id.
202. Id.
203. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent
System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2086-87 (2000).
204. Golden, supra note 11l,
at 108. Note, though, that the solution of allowing courts to

decide the scope of claims promotes the problem of introducing expensive ambiguity into the
system by allowing the PTO to approve broad claims, leaving the courts to clarify and invalidate.
205. Additionally, although outside the scope of this paper, a compulsory licensing scheme
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In a more specific sense, all of these approaches could be applied to
the hES cell problem. First, should hES cells be patentable? I propose
that hES cells (as distinct from hES cell-lines) should not be patentable.
However, any narrowly defined, downstream therapies coming out of
this research may be patented. For example, patent protection would be
available for individual hES cell-lines developed as described in the patent specification," 6 and for the method of isolation of hES cells. In the
short term, a strong case could be made for the revocation of WARF's
ES cell patent product claims. The PTO could reexamine the issued
patent, checking the examination procedure for mistakes.2 °7 Under limited conditions, °8 if the PTO agreed with this argument and found that
the ES cell patent product claims were mistakenly issued, it could
revoke the claims. Second, if the product claims are not revoked, courts
can invalidate them in infringement litigation. Third, if the product
claims are not invalidated, their scope could be narrowly construed to
cover only the cell-lines described in the specification. Finally, the
courts or Congress could make clear that such vaguely defined cell isolations are not patentable. The remainder of this Part discusses the doctrinal bases on which the PTO or courts may solve this problem.
A.

Invalidating the WARF hES Cell Patent Product Claims on
Grounds that Traditional PatentabilityRequirements Were
Not Satisfied

A solution to the problem of disproportionate control of hES cell
research by WARF is the invalidation of the WARF patent product
claims. Of course this would require a willing litigant and many years
could be applied to broad, upstream patented inventions. Yet, there are many problems with such
a solution, not the least of which would be the setting of a dangerous precedent. "The primary
argument against compulsory licensing is that it allows courts, not the parties themselves, to set
the terms of exchange." Merges, supra note 135, at 99. Alternatively, as part of its deliberations
on President Bush's hES cell decision, Congress could specify that the product claims are
unenforceable in light of President Bush's decision. This would excuse the courts from having to
make the decision. It may be more desirable to do it this way because it could be a number of
years before a case reaches the courts. Also, companies might not invest in hES cell improvement
research for fear of losing a court battle. Additionally, uncertainty in how a court might interpret
the scope of the ES cell patents will likely make bargaining inefficient. And, if through these
solutions patent law is unable to "achieve the ideal balance between the incentives for invention
and dissemination ....
perhaps Congress [should] provide biotechnology with a special regime of
protection." Golden, supra note I ll, at 108.
206. Thus, individual hES cell-lines would be protectable, just as cell-lines were found
patentable in Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479, 271 (Cal. 1990). See
infra Part III.A.3 (discussing Moore).
207. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (2002); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.510-1.570 (2002).
208. See Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in Administrative Revocation of U.S.
Patents: A Proposition for Opposition-andBeyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HICH TECH.
L.J. 63 (1998).
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before final resolution. Some avenues of attack are laid out below. Several patent doctrines protect basic and upstream research (as. opposed to

downstream applications of it) from being declared off-limits by the
issuance of a patent. These doctrines include the utility, enablement,
and written description requirements as well as the prohibition on pat-

enting products of nature.
1.
a.

ARE

ES

CELLS PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER?

The Product-of-Nature Prohibitionon Patentability

A patentable invention must be new.2 °9 Products of nature are theoretically unpatentable because they are not new, even if they were previously unknown to humans. Moreover, a product of nature is hardly an
invention. As stated by the Supreme Court in applying this doctrine to
cells, "the relevant distinction [is] not between living and inanimate
things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and

human-made inventions. '2 '0 Thus, while a genetically modified cell is
patentable, the Supreme Court did not hold that any cell is patentable.
This prohibition also serves to ensure that items that may be relied on by
people cannot be removed from general use by the issuance of a patent.
For example, one cannot patent a gene that exists inside a person, thus
requiring living people to pay royalties for the "use" of that gene. The
product-of-nature prohibition would thus seem to strongly block the patenting of hES cells. However, the patent system has allowed an excep-

tion to the doctrine: purified products of nature may in some cases be
patentable.

209. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2002); see also id.
§ 102.
210. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), established the validity of patents on
"life." In that case, the invention in question was a bacterium containing artificially introduced
plasmids. The patent examiner rejected the product claims covering the bacterium on "two
grounds: (1)that micro-organisms are 'products of nature,' and (2) that as living things they are
not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101." Id. at 306. Five Supreme Court Justices
thought otherwise, finding that the "claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to
a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter-a product of human ingenuity
'having a distinctive name, character [and] use.'" Id. at 309-10. This genetically modified
organism could be thought of as an "invention," because it truly had not existed before. Thus, it is
distinct from patenting a preexisting purified or isolated cell, for example an ES cell. The
"Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether naturally-occurring microorganisms that have
been newly isolated or purified also fall within the ambit of 'manufactures' or 'compositions of
matter.'
Eisenberg, supra note 193, at 189.
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b.

The PurificationException to the Product-of-Nature
PatentabilityProhibition

Is purified biological matter simply a discovery of a product of
nature, or is it a human-made invention? The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals 2 "1found the argument that purifications are unpatentable
under section 101 "wholly lacking in merit. The biologically pure culture of [the claim] clearly does not exist in, is not found in, and is not a
product of, 'nature.' It is man-made and can be produced only under
carefully controlled laboratory conditions. ' 1 2 The question is not so
simply answered though. Referring to patents covering DNA sequences,
Justice Stephen Breyer stated:
The most difficult question is deciding when these or other products
of genetic research reflect only discovery of an existing aspect of
nature, like Einstein's discovery of the principles of relativity, and
when they amount to a protectable invention or useful device.
Should it matter if the more apt description of the scientists work is
the discovery of how a portion of the body functions, rather than the
invention of how to use a part of that body to perform a useful, say,
diagnostic, task? This latter question will sometimes seem unanswerable. Cloning a previously unknown DNA sequence is a little like
the "discovery" of a preexisting part of the human body; it is also
and novel isolation of
something like the expensive, time-consuming,
2 13
a previously unknown molecule.
There is some tension here that probably emanates from the difficulty in characterizing biotechnology innovations.2 14 Patents originally
were envisioned to cover inventions such as machines, things clearly
that had not previously existed. But many biological discoveries have
existed previously. It is worth noting that patents on machines did not
provide protection equivalent to that provided by the WARF product
claims because other machines that could carry out the same function
might be invented, escaping the patent claims. In contrast, there is only
one chemical or biological structure. There is no way around the WARF
product claims. One cannot invent a new type of freshly purified hES
cell.
The courts may be willing to overlook the product-of-nature prohi211. The predecessor to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
212. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1035 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
213. Stephen G. Breyer, Genetic Advances and Legal hIstitutions, 28 SYMP. J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 23, 27 (2000).
214. Further complicating the issue, courts have held that purified naturally occurring metals
are not patentable subject matter. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. DeForest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641
(3d Cir. 1928). In the current pro-patent environment, however, it is questionable whether courts

would uphold these old cases.
CASES AND MATERIALS

ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN

(3d ed. 2002).

F.

DUFIFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:157

bition when purification or isolation is both difficult and useful. In such
a case, the purification is a large inventive leap. For example, Judge
Learned Hand espoused such an economic argument in Parke-Davis &
Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.,21 5 where he upheld claims to purified adrenaline because they "became for every practical purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically. '2 '6 Before the purification of adrenaline,
people settled for a much less potent and less safe form of adrenaline.
The purification was an important step in the progress of innovation.
Thus, at least regarding chemical and biotechnology discoveries, it may
be true that the product-of-nature doctrine is no longer an important bar
to patentability. This is true because many biopharmaceutical inventions
require purifying chemical or biological materials to purity levels considered unnatural according to Judge Hand's formulation. Note, however, that this formulation does not apply to the hES cell patent product
claims.
c.

hES Cells in Particular

The PTO obviously has viewed purified ES cells as patentable subject matter.2 17 At present, the issue has not appeared before courts.
While patent infringement litigation involving adult bone marrowderived stem cells has been heard by the Federal Circuit, the issue of
whether the claim covered patentable subject matter 218 was never
reached.21 9 Instead, the court focused on determining what was meant
by the language "substantially free" when describing purification of the
blood stem cells, and determining whether the claims were infringed.
Because the claim 220 was very similar to the WARF patent and the court
did not feel compelled to address its patentability with respect to the
product-of-nature prohibition, it seems unlikely that courts will overturn
the PTO's decision to grant a patent for ES cells.
But the courts should look more deeply into the purification exception in this context. Analysis of the hES cell patents reveals that the
purification exception to the product-of-nature prohibition has been
abused. First, the patented hES cells are not purified in the sense that
the adrenaline was in Parke Davis. In that case, the inventive step was
215. 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
216. Id. at 103.
217. Todd Dikinson, Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Acting Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks, comments before the Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human
Services, Education and Related Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Jan. 12, 1999,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpalopa/bulletin/stemcell.pdf.
218. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
219. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
220. See U.S. Pat. No. 4,714,680 (issued Dec. 22, 1987).
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preparing adrenaline in such a way that impurities were removed. In the
hES cell patents, purification per se is not the inventive step. It is trivial
to separate hES cells from the blastocyst. Instead, the inventive step was
developing a method to keep them alive in culture in their pluri potent
state. It is this method that should be patented, not the "purified" hES
cells themselves. Second, Judge Hand's holding in Parke Davis was
likely motivated by economic considerations: by removing the impurities, the adrenaline immediately became a commercially viable and
much sought-after product. The inventive step directly led to a commercial use. In contrast, as described in the hES cell patents, the separation
of hES cells from the blastocyst added no economic value to the technology. First, such separation was easily performed prior to Dr. Thomson's
work. Second, the disclosed technology is very far removed from commercialization. It might be useful to keep, in mind the Supreme Court's
comments in Brenner v. Manson that "a patent is not a hunting license.
It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful
conclusion. '[A] patent system must be related to the world of commerce rather than to the realm of philosophy .... 221
The courts and the PTO should reinvigorate the product-of-nature
prohibition, and overlook it only in cases where purification truly represents a human inventive step that leads directly to commercialization
(that is, a downstream invention). Along with prohibition on patenting
formulas and natural laws, the product-of-nature prohibition serves a
useful function: it permits free exchange of upstream information upon
which many improvers rely to develop useful innovations. In a real
sense, such upstream research is a stem, just like stem cells, from which
many varied innovations may be developed. Additionally, the productof-nature prohibition should also be more rigorously applied to other
biopharmaceutical patent applications.

2.

THE UTILITY REQUIREMENT

The utility requirement 222 for patentability encompasses requirements of usefulness in the invention as well as disclosure of that usefulness in the patent specification. 2 3 In that sense it is tied together with
the enablement and written description requirements discussed in the
next section. To satisfy the utility requirement the patent applicant must
disclose a specific, practical use for the claimed invention and disclose
221. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
222. The utility requirement is found in 35 U.S.C. § 101: "Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title."
223. Eisenberg, supra note 203, at 2086-87.
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the best mode of using the invention such that those having ordinary.
skill in the art can make and use the invention without having to do
undue experimentation. 224 A "prophetic," that is, not yet tested or operable, disclosed use "may be sufficient if there is no reason to doubt that
the instructions are adequate to make the invention operable for the
described use without undue experimentation. 2 2 5 The utility requirement may sometimes be problematic in the sense that only a single use
need be demonstrated; when a patent is granted on the basis of one use,
the patent rights extend to all possible uses. 226 Thus, it is especially
important that the PTO and the courts strictly require an adequate use
before passing on the utility of the invention.
What constitutes an adequate use? The utility requirement can be
conceptualized as a timing device: an invention is simply not ready for
patent protection if there is no demonstrated practical use. Thus, the
utility requirement may be a good way to distinguish upstream from
downstream research. 27 The Supreme Court recognized this problem in
Brenner v. Manson, in which it stated that if a patent were allowed prior
to showing utility, it "may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps
unknowable area. Such a patent may confer power to block off whole
areas of scientific development, without compensating benefit to the
public. 2 2 8 Yet, how is use defined in biotechnology patents? Clearly a
drug that has passed FDA approval is a downstream product. Nonetheless, as stated above, many upstream biotechnology discoveries are also
useful. For example, upstream techniques or chemicals used to develop
the drug might be sold as final product research tools. Conversely, a
compound that might serve as a downstream drug may also be used as a
research tool.
Additionally, usefulness has not been defined by the courts as being
coextensive with marketability. Recent Federal Circuit cases suggest the
utility requirement is not much of an impediment to patentability. Biotechnology inventions have been held useful even with the concession
that much future research and development is needed prior to putting the
23 °
invention on the market.2 2 9 For example, in In re Brana,
claims to
novel compounds that are structurally similar to other compounds that
224. See 35 U.S.C § 112 (2002); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Eisenberg, supra
note 193, at 207-08.
225. Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentability of
Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 A.I.P.L.A. Q.
J. 1, 16 (1995). See i re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
226. Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 225, at 14.
227. Rai, supra note 102, at 839.
228. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
229. Eisenberg, supra note 203, at 2087.
230. 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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displayed antitumor activity in mice were rejected by the PTO because
they were not independently shown to be effective in humans. The Federal Circuit reversed. The impetus for the reversal likely rests in the
difficulties of invention in the biotechnology industry. There are many
potential pharmaceutical compounds that could be used to treat diseases.
Such compounds usually take years to develop and years of rigorous
testing to satisfy the FDA's requirements of safety and effectiveness.
The court did not believe that the patent system should require the same
rigorous evidence of safe and efficacious treatment of disease as evidence of usefulness: "Were we to require Phase II testing in order to
prove utility, the associated costs would prevent many companies from
obtaining patent protection on promising new inventions, thereby eliminating an incentive to pursue, through research and development, potential cures in many crucial areas such as the treatment of cancer."23 '
Although the utility requirement may be easily satisfied according
to the courts,2 32 in the context of DNA sequence patents-and now in
the hES cell patents-the utility requirement could do some work. For
example, just as for hES cells, patentability of DNA sequences is problematic. WARF claims to have a stake in all future hES cell-lines. Similarly, simply by sequencing a DNA sequence, a DNA sequence patent
holder could claim partial rights to any therapy developed either using or
acting on the DNA sequence. It is also likely that, because there are a
finite number of genes, such DNA patents will end up being relevant to
many therapeutic discoveries. In response to such concerns, the PTO
established new utility examination guidelines for consideration when
evaluating patent claims comprising DNA sequences.2 33
The guidelines now require specific and substantial utility.
This contrasts with a general utility that would be applicable to
the broad class of theinvention. For example, a claim to a polynucle-

otide whose use is disclosed simply as a "gene probe" or "chromosome marker" would not be considered to be specific in the absence
of a disclosure of a specific DNA target. Similarly, a general statement of diagnostic utility, such as diagnosing an unspecified disease,
would ordinarily be insufficient absent a disclosure of what conditions can be diagnosed.234
Substantial utility is a "utility that defines a 'real world' use. Utili231. Id. at 1568.

232. Eisenberg, supra note 203, at 2085.
233. Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials, at www.uspto.gov/web/menu/
utility.pdf [hereinafter Training Materials]. It must be noted that the courts are not bound to these
PTO Guidelines. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (2001).
234. Training Materials, supra note 233, at 5-6.
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ties that require or constitute carrying out further research to identify or
reasonably confirm a 'real world' context of use are not substantial utiliSome examples of insubstantial utilities given by the PTO
ties. '
include "[b]asic research such as studying the properties or the claimed
product itself or the mechanisms in which the material is involved...
[and a] method of treating an unspecified disease or condition."2'36
Thus, it is not enough simply to isolate and list a new DNA sequence
and describe further research that is needed to develop a real-world use.
One must now demonstrate a clear use for it. The PTO and the courts
should require the same demonstration of use when reviewing patents
covering any freshly purified cells, especially those derived from
humans.
These recent developments concerning DNA sequences suggest
that WARF's hES cell patent product claims should have been rejected
based on lack of utility, at least with regard to therapeutic uses. No
therapy has yet been developed, or even begun to be developed. The
only use demonstrated by -Dr. Thomson was a research use. Thus, it is
very much like the "bare genetic sequence" deemed unpatentable under
the new PTO guidelines. This is not to say that research uses are not
adequate for satisfying the utility requirement, but a real-world research
use, other than merely studying the cells themselves, must be clearly
demonstrated. To analogize to DNA patents, claiming stem cells for
research use would be more like claiming DNA in general (in contrast to
individual DNA sequences) for research use. If this is the standard of
utility, anything could be claimed for research use. Yet, as described
above, the PTO requires more of a showing of utility for DNA patents.
One must now show some specific understanding of the importance of
the specific sequence and how it might be used in a narrow sense. Similarly, hES cells are likely to have varied and distinct properties depending on from whom they are derived, how they are derived, and how they
are treated in culture. The courts and the PTO should require a more
detailed showing of utility of each individual hES cell-line based on its
unique properties. By strictly construing the utility requirement in this
way, the PTO and the courts can prevent overbroad patenting of illunderstood upstream research. A reasonable implication of such a policy would be that only unique individual cell-lines for which a clear use
has been shown may be patentable. For example, perhaps one inventor
may discover an hES cell-line that is particularly good at fighting liver
cancer, while another may derive a different hES cell-line that is more
suitable for treating Parkinson's Disease.
235. Id. at 6.
236. Id.
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ENABLEMENT AND WRITTEN DESCRIPTION: COMPARISON OF

HES CELLS TO
HES CELL-LINES

FRESHLY PURIFIED

HUMAN-MADE

The enablement requirement specifies that the invention must be
disclosed in such detail that others can make and use it without having to
perform undue experimentation.2 37 The written description requirement
serves to announce to the public what the invention is and to put the
public in possession of it: the invention must be described in "sufficient
detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention ...with all of its limitations. 2 38 While these two requirements are doctrinally distinct, they
can be discussed together for the purposes of this article. Both emanate
from the bargain the patent system makes with the inventor: a limited
monopoly in exchange for disclosure. If an invention has not been enabled or adequately described in writing 239 the PTO should not issue the
patent, and if it does issue it, the courts should invalidate the relevant
claims.
Additionally, these doctrines may be the most appropriate patent
doctrines for defining claim scope. 24 ° Both doctrines aim to ensure that
the inventor was in possession of the claimed invention. The goal is to
ensure that the scope of the claims is not broader than the invention
possessed and disclosed.2 4 ' These doctrines thus attempt to limit the
237. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also Consol. Elec. Light Co. v.
McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465 (1895) (finding that description of a single fiber did not
entitle the patentee to a monopoly for all fibrous materials for incandescent conductors).
238. 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1104 (Jan. 5, 2001); see also Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d
1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991). There is an exception, however: later discovery of divergent properties of
species within the genus will not result in invalidation of the claims.
[E]nablement is tested only as of the time the original inventor files for a patent. If
the original inventor has at that timfe
enabled the use of an entire class of products, a
claim covering that entire class is warranted. But if the class subsequently expands
to include other species not conceived at the time of the first patent, the generic
claim language will allow the first inventor to capture those new species within the
scope of his claim.
Lemley, supra note 148, at 1009.
239. These doctrines arise from 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2002).
240. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see
also Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991); infra Part III.B.2.
241. As the Supreme Court explained,
[T]o hold that one, who had discovered that a certain fibrous or textile material
answered the required purpose, should obtain the right to exclude everybody from
the whole domain of fibrous and textile materials, and thereby shut out any further
efforts to discover a better specimen of that class than the patentee had employed,
would be an unwarranted extension of his monopoly, and operate rather to
discourage than to promote invention.
Consol. Elec. Light Co., 159 U.S. at 476.
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claims to the inventive step, without narrowing the claims to the point

where the patent becomes worthless.242 Another useful function of these
requirements is that they force the patentee to clearly define the invention, in theory permitting others to know clearly the boundaries of the
invention in order to avoid infringing it.

Problems of appropriately defining claim scope arise when a patentee claims a genus in an unpredictable field such as biotechnology.2 4 3

Patentees who claim a genus usually only describe a few species within
the genus. In such claims, the specification must describe "a representative number of species "244 that must be "representative of the entire

genus.

245

But the written description requirement is not satisfied when

an essential feature of the invention is not disclosed. 46 This is particularly problematic in unpredictable fields in which not much is known
about the genus: "adequate written description of a genus which
embraces widely variant species cannot be achieved by disclosing only
one species with the genus. '2 4 7 Broad claims may be rejected on the
basis of too few demonstrated examples.
The enablement and written description requirements have been
used to invalidate or narrow the scope of broad claims in biotechnology
24 8 the
patents. For example, in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical,
Federal Circuit found that a claim directed toward all DNA sequences
242. "The boundary defining the excludable subject matter must be carefully set: it must
protect the inventor, so that commercial development is encouraged; but the claims must be
commensurate with the inventor's contribution. Thus the specification must meet the
requirements of § 112." In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 741.
243. "In cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions and
physiological activity, the scope of' enablement obviously varies inversely with the degree of
unpredictability of the factors involved." In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970). "The
scope of the claims must be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement." Nat'l Recovery
Tech., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also In re
Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991). But, "where a number of materials or devices are
substitutable because they have similar characteristics, the patentee may claim the generic class of
materials, so long as he describes the general class and its characteristics with sufficient precision
that others can identify and use them without 'undue experimentation.'" Lemley, supra note 148,
at 1003.
244. 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1106 (Jan. 5, 2001).
245. Id.
246. This principle goes back to Consolidated Electric Light Co., 159 U.S. 465 (1895). In that
case, a claim to the use of any vegetable fiber (that is, an entire class of products) as a filament in
a lamp was not upheld because the inventors "had not done sufficient work to justify treating all
vegetable fibers as interchangeable." Lemley, supra note 148, at 1002. The Supreme Court ties
the concept to the inventive step: "[]f ... there were some general quality, running through the
whole fibrous and textile kingdom, which distinguished it from every other, and gave it a peculiar
fitness for the particular purpose, the man who discovered such a quality might justly be entitled
to a patent ....
" Consol. Elec. Light Co., 159 U.S. at 475. The hES cell patents should be found
invalid under Consolidated Electric Light Co. reasoning.
247. 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1106 (Jan. 5, 2001).
248. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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that will encode any polypeptide having the blood-cell-productionincrease activity of erythropoietin (EPO) was too broad. According to
the court this claim was not enabled because it "is not sufficient, having
made the gene and a handful of analogs whose activity has not been
clearly ascertained, to claim all possible genetic sequences that have
EPO-like activity. '24 9 Similarly, the Federal Circuit has also found nonenabled a claim to a method for producing any peptide in any plant cell
because it was supported only by a single example .2 "° The court found
that there was too much unpredictable research remaining in order to
produce any peptide in any cell. 2 1' These are examples of genus claims
that were not sufficiently enabled by description of species.
Additionally, even if a genus is enabled, it may not pass the written
description requirement. The Federal Circuit has invalidated on written
description grounds a claim to the complementary DNA encoding
human insulin because the specification only disclosed the sequence of
rat insulin and then described how one might isolate the human version.
An adequate written description of the human insulin sequence was not
provided.25 2 In the case of gene patents, a "definition by function . . .
does not suffice to define the genus because it is only an indication of
' 253
what the gene does, rather than what it is."
Comparing the WARF hES cell patent product claims to the courts'
and PTO's approach to DNA sequence patents indicates that the WARF
product claims do not satisfy the written description or enablement
requirements. For example, the PTO has stated that a "biomolecule
sequence described only by a functional characteristic without any
known or disclosed correlation between that function and the structure
of the sequence, normally is not a sufficient identifying characteristic for
249. Id.
250. hi re Goodman, II F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
251. Id. "For instance, production of peptides in monocotyledonous plants involves extensive
problems unaddressed by [the] specification." Id.
252. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
253. Id.; see also Mark J. Stewart, The Written Description Requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(1): The Standard after Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 32 IND. L.
REv. 537 (1999).
[l]t would seem that the holding in Lilly . . . avoided a disaster that would have
crippled the biotechnology industry. . . . Through application of the written
description requirement, courts can distinguish between claims to technologies that
are too broad or basic to justify patent protection, and those dealing with other types
of technologies that are more predictable and may justify broader protection. Thus,
the Federal Circuit has decided that the uniqueness of biotechnology inventions
claiming DNA sequences requires the application of a stringent written description
requirement to protect the public from inventors seeking to slow the pace or
research by preempting future developments before they arrive.
Id. at 563-64.
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written description purposes, even when accompanied by a method of
obtaining the claimed sequence. ' 254 This directly applies to the hES cell
patent product claims. The cells in the claims are described by functional characteristics (for example, their ability to stay alive in culture
without differentiating, and then to differentiate into many types of
cells). There is no known correlation between that function and the scientific basis for it. This is a problem because different ES cells may
behave differently. ES cells are likely to be functionally distinct
depending on how and from where they are isolated, and how they are
maintained.
The hES cell claims are also analogous to those at issue in
Amgen."' The claims in Amgen were to all DNA sequences-even
those not yet known or described-having a certain function. The
claims in the hES cell patents are to all hES cells that stay alive in culture retaining pluri potent activity. In neither case was the matter having
this activity defined. Just as many different and unknown types of DNA
were covered by the claims in Amgen, many different and unknown
types of cells are covered by the hES cell product claims. For example,
all ES cells are not interchangeable. Scientists have found "[w]ide variations between different [ES cell-]lines, between individual colonies of
cells or subclones, and even between individual cells within each colony."2'56 Some "researchers have complained of difficulty coaxing
[WARF's] stem cells to grow and differentiate into usable tissue. They
press for the creation of many more colonies of stem cells. '2 5' 7 There
were alleged to be only about eighty hES cell-lines in existence on
August 9, 2000. hES cells derived from each individual person will contain a unique genome2 58 certainly making it likely that hES cells with
widely varying properties remain to be discovered. Because all varieties
of hES cells are not described in the written description, the claims are
not enabled or supported by the written description.
The California Supreme Court's conclusion in Moore v. Regents of
254. 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1108 n.14 (2001).
255. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
256. "These differences in gene activation may or may not trigger abnormalities later in
development, and it may only be the cumulative action of many abnormally expressed genes that
produces the excessive growth typical in clones." Ted Agres, Scientists Clone Solutions to Stem
Cell Debate, 15 SCIENTIST 37 (2001). See D. Humphreys et al., Epigenetic histability in ES Cells
and Cloned Mice, 293 SCIENCE 95 (2001).
257. Elias, supra note 58.
258. In this context, the WARF patents could be compared to a patent covering all freshly
purified DNA. Of course, the PTO would not issue such a patent. Instead, the PTO requires a
showing of utility and a strict description of the DNA sequence being claimed. Similar standards
should be applied to the hES cell context.
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the University of California21 9 supports the notion that patents for hES
cell-lines, but not the hES cell itself, should be upheld. In Moore, the
court distinguished between freshly dissected cells and human-made
cell-lines. A cell-line is different than a freshly dissected cell. A cellline is an immortalized cell-line that is propagated in carefully controlled
culture conditions by scientists. 26 ° Each cell in a cell-line is generally

identical, and very likely has different properties from any naturally
occurring cell. 2 6 ' Thus, in a very real sense, a cell-line is an "invention"
whereas a freshly isolated cell is at most a "discovery," although that is a
stretch because most cells are well known.

Once a scientist contributes an inventive alteration to the cell, the
cell becomes a unique cell-line: a man-made "invention" that can be
described sufficiently narrowly in a patent specification. I propose that a
cell only becomes the property of someone after it is transformed into a
cell-line. At that point it has distinct characteristics that might be different from other cell-lines, even those derived from the same original cell
sample.
This analysis can be extended to the hES cell patent product claims.
Although hES cells in general should be unpatentable, patents on spe-

cific unique cell-lines developed by the inventors are permissible. Such
a policy
ment by
tem has
because

currently exists with the satisfaction of the enablement requiredepositing cell-lines in a central depository.2 62 Indeed, this sysbeen found adequate for meeting the enablement requirement
of the inherent difficulty in describing cell-lines due to their

259. 793 P.2d 479 (cal. 1990). The California Supreme Court found that it was permissible
for a doctor to use a patient's cells to create a cell-line, and to patent and commercialize that cellline without compensating the patient.
[T]he patented cell line is both factually and legally distinct from the cells taken
from Moore's body. Federal law permits the patenting of organisms that represent
the product of "human ingenuity," but not naturally occurring organisms ...
Human cell lines are patentable because "long-term adaptation and growth of
human tissues and cells in culture is difficult-often consideredan art ... " and the
probability of success is low ....
It is this inventive effort that patent law rewards,
not the discovery of naturally occurring raw materials.
Id. at 492-93. The effect of the holding is thought to be that once a cell leaves a body, it is no
longer owned by the person. That is not exactly right: the distinction is between naturally
occurring cells and artificially cultured cell-lines. "The distinction between primary cells (cells
taken directly from the body) and patented cell lines is not purely a legal one. Cells change while
being developed into a cell line and continue to change over time." Id. at 493 n.35.
260. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 24.
261. Id.
262. In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1392-93 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (approving the use of deposit
to disclose microorganisms); see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801-1.809 (1991). Curiously, the Federal
Circuit has found that while the enablement requirement is satisfied by depositing biological
material, the written description requirement is not. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.
3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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myriad unknown properties. If describing a single cell-line has been
found impossible, then how can description of the entire range of hES
cells that may possibly be derived from every existing person be possible? Instead, the same approach should be applied to hES cells: once a
unique cell-line is developed, it should be deposited. At this point the
enablement requirement will be satisfied and the scientist will have
demonstrated a clear inventive step. Moreover, this will promote innovation as scientists continue to seek better cell-lines. If a single patent
owner owns all hES cells-both freshly purified hES cells and unique
human-made cell-lines-scientists will be less likely to inquire into the
development of better hES cell-lines.

4.

THE REVERSE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

Under the reverse doctrine of equivalents (DOE), a court decides
that a defendant has infringed a patent claim, but nevertheless allows
that infringement26 3 for equitable reasons.26 4 "The purpose of the
'reverse' doctrine is to prevent unwarranted extension of the claims
beyond a fair scope of the patentee's invention. 2 6 5 Courts the reverse
DOE, rarely use but they may do so when, even though the infringer
violates the literal claims, his invention is fundamentally different from
or is a radical improvement on the invention covered by the infringed
claims. Professor Robert Merges characterizes the reverse DOE as a
"safety valve" or a "judicial response to the likelihood of a breakdown in
bargaining between inventors who pioneer a new technology and those
who later develop key improvements. 2 66 In this sense, the reverse DOE
may be an answer to the tragedy of the anticommons problem.
In Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.,267 the
Federal Circuit remanded to determine whether a method of producing a
protein through recombinant DNA techniques should be excused from
infringing a patent that claimed the purified natural protein.
Genentech's method was a large economic and scientific advance on
Scripps's method.2 68 Instead of having to painstakingly purify the protein from human sources, scientists could prepare the protein in bacteria
in large amounts, free from human and viral contaminants, relatively
quickly and cheaply. Nevertheless, Scripps had claimed the purified pro263. See Boyden Power-Brake
appearance of the doctrine.
264. Merges, supra note 135, at
265. Scripps Clinic & Research
1991).
266. Merges, supra note 135, at
267. 927 F.2d 1565.
268. Merges, supra note 135, at

Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537 (1898), for the first
91.
Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
75.
93.
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tein, and even though Genentech's method for making it was vastly
superior, Genentech literally infringed Scripps's claims.
Merges believes that the reverse DOE is justified in Scripps on the
26 9
basis of "the large social welfare loss caused by lack of agreement.
The value of the improvement was so great as to support the issuance of
a property right to the improver. This argument is very similar to the
argument made by Judge Learned Hand in Parke-Davis in support of
patenting a purified product of nature.2 7 ° In both cases, the courts seek
to reward an important technological advance. In Parke-Davisthe court
found a way to award a patent, whereas in Scripps the court found a way
to ignore a previous patent. Interestingly, in both cases the patent at
issue involved purification of a product of nature. In this sense, in
Scripps the reverse DOE is an exception to an exception to the rule that
inventions must be new.
Another area where the reverse DOE might be appropriately used is
in the field of DNA sequences. Uses of the sequences of whole genes
might be excused from infringing patent claims to partial sequences of
those genes, otherwise known as ESTs. 271 The basis for excused
infringement is that the value of the full sequence would be so great as
to characterize its discovery as a "radical improvement" over the pioneer
patent claiming the EST sequence.
In light of these two examples, the reverse DOE is highly relevant
in the hES cell context. The hES cell patents themselves disclose no
obvious therapeutic use for hES cells. In addition, the only commercial
use is the sale of the cell-lines to other researchers. Although there are
many suggestions for which the cells might be useful, much work and
investment is required to realize any therapeutic uses. This is especially
true in light of the fact that many envisioned uses will require FDA
approval. Any such use will be a big advance on the state of knowledge
as presented in the pioneer patent, and as existing in the scientific field
at the time of the patent. Any such improvement should be excused
from infringing by making use of the reverse DOE doctrine.
Although use of the reverse DOE to excuse future work on hES
cells from infringing the WARF patent product claims is desirable,
widespread use of this doctrine should be avoided. Patent claims should
be respected. Otherwise, a strength of the patent system-the certainty
it provides to industry in knowing how to plan its course of research and
269. Id. at 94.
270. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911); see also supra
Part 1II.A.1.b.
271. Michael S. Greenfield, Note, Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science Struggling with
the Patent Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1078-79 (1992).
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development, as well as how to value patent claims in licensing or
investment negotiations-will be diminished. Ideally, the PTO should
not issue such claims in the first place. The reverse DOE should only be
used in extreme cases, such as when the PTO slips up.
B.

Narrow Interpretationof the Scope of Product-of-Nature
Patent Claims

If broad patent claims covering upstream research are issued by the
PTO and are not invalidated by the courts, they should be construed
narrowly if possible, since they impede the entrance of competitors and
other innovators. In particular, the scope of claims covering purified
products of nature such as hES cells should be narrowly construed
because they are not only likely upstream discoveries, but in some cases
they may not accurately reflect the inventive leap disclosed. The challenge is finding a way to encourage valuable advances in purification or
isolation technology without stifling the development of uses for the
purified substance. The hope is that the law will optimize the incentives
for both pioneer and improvement inventors, so that the market is not
dominated by a single firm. 72 According to this solution patents may
be relatively freely issued, but the scope of the claims should be narrowly tailored by the PTO and narrowly construed by the courts.27 3 This
solution would be consistent with patents' current value to entrepreneurs
as bargaining chips in attracting investment (that is, the PTO would continue to issue patent claims covering such inventions), while not driving
away other ventures that may develop similar technologies (that is, the
claims issued would only be very narrow).
How should claims' scope be narrowed? Some have suggested that
claims' scope be tailored to the innovation's economic value. Thus,
their scope would be limited to only what is necessary for the inventor to
"reap returns on their inventions sufficient to recover investment in
research and development. 2 74 Nevertheless, the PTO does not make
economic analyses of industries and the putative effect of the patent
application on them, and rightly so; it would be unreasonable to expect
patent examiners to attempt to do this. Instead, I propose that patent
examiners simply ensure that the claim coverage is coextensive with the
272. Merges & Nelson, supra note 155, at 843-44.
273. The PTO is best positioned to ensure that claims do not cover more than the disclosed
inventive step. Of course, the courts have a role, especially in the case of the hES cell patents.
Alternatively, leaving the solution to the courts introduces uncertainty as to the value of the patent
claims. Bargaining costs would likely increase as companies would not be sure what they are
receiving by licensing the patent, and patent holders might attempt to seek more than the true
value of their claims.
274. Ko, supra note 115, at 793.
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inventive step and the invention described in the disclosure. For example, with regard to the hES cell patents, the inventive step is both the
method of keeping hES cells alive in their pluri potent state in culture
without differentiating, and a handful of unique human-made cell-lines.
Thus, the scope of the WARF product claims-covering all freshly purified hES cells and cell-lines-is not appropriately defined.
Some of the aforementioned patentability doctrines may be used to
define patent scope.2 75 For example, the enablement and written
description requirements could be used to restrict the claims' coverage
solely to the hES cell-lines described in the specification or those that
are deposited. Unfortunately for WARF, however, it will be difficult for
the courts to narrow the scope of the claims in this way. The plain
language of the claims indicates that they cover all hES cells. It seems
impossible to narrow these claims without reading limitations into them,
something the courts are loath to do. Thus, the courts could either invalidate or apply the reverse DOE to the WARF patent product claims.
Any significant newly developed use of hES cells should be held to be
noninfringing. Such uses would certainly be radical improvements, as
the patents do not describe how the cells will be used. While the WARF
claims might have to be declared invalid, the PTO should ensure that the
scope of future similar patent claims are coextensive with the actual celllines described in the specification or deposited in a central bank.
IV.

SHOULD

HES

CELLS BE CATEGORICALLY UNPATENTABLE?

The combination of the WARF patents and President Bush's decision presents a significant barrier to researchers who wish to study and
develop therapies using hES cells. Congress could intervene by either
removing WARF's property right altogether or requiring compulsory
licensing of the patent. Similarly, for future inventions, should the patent system apply different standards to certain types of biological inventions than it does to other inventions? As this article has demonstrated,
biological inventions are unique; for example, they often consist of discoveries of products of nature, not necessarily human-made machinetype inventions. Perhaps the patent system should apply a more exacting examination procedure to them. Alternatively, the patent system
could categorically refuse to issue patents covering certain materials
such as DNA sequences or freshly purified cells or molecules. The next
section begins with a discussion of such a generalized categorical ban on
275. It has been suggested that enablement and written description may be the most
appropriate patent doctrines for defining scope. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
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the patentability of certain biotechnology inventions. It is followed by a
discussion of whether it would be wise for Congress to create a specific
exception to patentability in the case of hES cells, particularly in
response to President Bush's political decision.
A.

Should Different Patentability Standards Apply to
Biological Inventions?

Should biology or certain subsets of biology be treated differently
by the patent system? Could the problem of patenting hES cells be dealt
with by making such cell purification product claims generally
unpatentable?
Presently, patent law does not distinguish between fields as a matter of doctrine.2 76 This approach has permitted easy justification of patents on living things, computer algorithms, and business methods.2 77
Yet studies have shown that the importance and role of patents varies
greatly between industries.278 Perhaps certain biotechnology inventions
should be subject to different patentability considerations than are other
inventions. 27 9 Biotechnology discoveries do not fit neatly into the traditional conception of mechanical inventions that supported the development of the patent system.2 8 ° Moreover, the question of how to
approach the issue of whether products of nature should be patentable
never arose in the original context of mechanical inventions. 28' Keeping
in mind patent law's goal of providing incentives for discovery and disclosure of technology, should "Congress revise the patent statutes, revising categories or creating special forms of protection? How do we strike
a proper balance between the resulting legal complexity and the simplicity promised by a 'one size fits all' law of patents? '28 2
There is already some different treatment of different fields. For
276. The patent system promotes a "one-size-fits-all system, ensuring that the kinds of
innovations the law protects are similar enough that a single set of rules is a reasonable
approximation of how best to promote progress .
Eisenberg, supra note 203, at 2084.
277. Id.
278. Id.; see also Eisenberg, supra note 146, at 166-67.
279. But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Who Decides the Extent of Rights in Intellectual Property?,
in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 405, 405 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). Judge Easterbrook
expresses the view that different treatment of different industries is a bad idea because "[w]hen the
law of intellectual property is general, most people are apt to support the best possible set of legal
rules ....
Industry-specific rules are the playgrounds of interest groups." Id. at 408. "Narrow
laws also tend to detract from the force of competition among producers of intellectual property
and thus magnify their own shortcomings. More general statutes have been contract-enabling:
they create property rights that set the stage for competition and contract." Id. at 409.
280. Ko, supra note 115, at 777.
281. See id.

282. Breyer, supra note 213, at 27.
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example, the distinction between the predictability of downstream developments resulting from chemical versus mechanical inventions has
resulted in a distinct application of the patent system for chemical inventions.28 3 Moreover, the Federal Circuit's decision in Scripps suggests
that the courts might distinguish biotechnology inventions from chemical ones for categorical purposes. 28 4 The Scripps court remanded to
determine whether, by applying the reverse DOE, a protein made using
recombinant DNA methods could escape infringing a claim to the protein purified from its natural source, even though it literally infringed.2 8 5
Such an approach had not been previously applied to chemical compounds.286 Another example deals with the enablement requirement.
The PTO has allowed this requirement to be satisfied in the area of biotechnology when it is seemingly impossible to adequately describe the
invention, by simply depositing an example of the invention, for example, a cell-line. So it is true that patent law doctrines are modified in
subtle ways depending on the patent and technology in question; indeed,
decisions on which doctrines apply, and how to apply them, are made on
a case-by-case basis.
Nonetheless, the courts and the PTO should be wary of cordoning
off broad fields-in this case biotechnology or a subset of biotechnology
(that is, cells derived from humans)-from other fields. The flexibility
of the patent system is a valuable asset as many industries combine to
produce inventions. Indeed, some of the most creative and useful inventions arise from the intersecting margins of seemingly distinct industries.
For example, bioinformatics-a combination of biotechnology, computer hardware and software and, sometimes, mechanical inventionshas emerged recently as an important subfield of biotechnology. Congress, the courts, and the PTO cannot predict what inventions lie ahead,
and thus cannot know the implications of engaging in such a policy.
Indeed, in Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court expressed its reluctance to
declare that life forms were unpatentable for these reasons.2 87 Although
283. Ko, supra note 115, at 794.
Adjustments to mechanical inventions produce predictable consequences.
Conversely, a chemical patent's specification teaches little about how varying the
chemical's structure or reactive conditions would alter its effects. To explain the
less expansive protection they accord chemical arts, courts reason that the breadth of
claims a patent's disclosure supports "varies inversely with the degree of

unpredictability of the factors involved."
Id. (quoting In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
284. Id. at 788.
285. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
286. See Robert L. Baechtold et al., Property Rights in Living Matter: Is New Law Required?,
68 DENV. U. L. REV. 141, 171 (1991).
287. The Supreme Court has said that Congress drafted the patent statutes broadly so they
would include as patentable subject matter unforeseeable inventions because "the inventions most
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the Court specified that, if any branch were to do so, it should be the
legislature, it also hinted about the wisdom of the legislature doing so. 288
The Court dismissed the notion that Congress should make a decision
prior to invention about allowing patenting because the very nature of
invention is that we do not know what innovations are coming next.289
One cannot expect that Congress can anticipate what scientists and engineers will do. The courts and Congress should be very careful about
declaring off-limits areas that may need patent protection.
Instead of resorting to new, rigidly defined patentability categories
to deal with the patenting of upstream discoveries such as naturally
occurring materials like cells and DNA, the PTO should narrowly tailor
the claims, as discussed above, to the inventive step described in the
specification. Under this approach, product claims to products of nature
would rarely be issued unless there is a strong showing of human invention and a compelling, well-developed use. Moreover, the courts should
police the PTO by either invalidating or reducing in scope, where possible, overly broad claims to upstream, basic research.
B.

Should Congress Off-Set President Bush's Decision via the
Patent System?

Should Congress intervene in the patent system by making an
exception in the case of hES cells, thus relieving some of the pressure
applied by President Bush's decision? As part of its deliberations on
President Bush's hES cell decision, and on human cloning bills, Congress could specify that WARF's product claims are unenforceable.
This would excuse the courts from having to make the decision. A benefit of this approach is that it would be relatively quick; it could be a
number of years before a case reaches the courts. Also, companies
might not invest in hES cell improvement research for fear of losing a
court battle. Congress could intervene either removing the property
right altogether or requiring compulsory licensing of the patent.2 9 ' If
Congress required compulsory licensing then any firm could use the patent, either free-of-charge or for a fee.29 '
Less extreme forms of compulsory licensing can be envisioned;
benefiting mankind are those that 'push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like.'"
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980) (quoting Great A.&P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
288. Id. ("Congress employed broad general language in drafting § 101 precisely because such
invention are often unforeseeable.").

289. Id.
290. Congress may subject a patented subject to compulsory licensing as long as it pays
reasonable compensation to the patent holder. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2002).
291. Rai, supra note 102, at 816.
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afterall, a compulsory license is similar to a contract, and the contract
terms could be set by Congress. For example, as a form of compulsory
licensing, improving firms might be allowed to use hES cells for experimental uses, but not be permitted to sell them. Eisenberg has argued for
an experimental-use exception for research tools. 292 Under this
approach, use of a patented item in research would be permissible, but
once the result of that use is developed into a product, the user would
need to negotiate with the patent holder for rights to commercialize. A
benefit of this approach is that it concentrates negotiations ex post only
to those products that will be commercialized. Another benefit is that
such final products can be analyzed from a traditional patentability perspective to determine whether they infringe. This approach eliminates
the ability of patent holders to stifle research by prohibiting the use of
tools that do not appear in the final product.
Yet, it is less certain how effective this approach would be when
the research tool appears in the final product. Although hES cells are
now used as research tools, final products currently envisioned involve
the use of hES cells. Assuming the hES cell claims are not invalidated,
there is very little hope that such a final product could escape infringement. Thus, WARF remains in a position of dominant bargaining
power, even in an experimental-use-exception regime. Indeed, this is
precisely the bargain that WARF is seeking to strike with its contracts
that set the terms under which others may use hES cells.2 9 3 What company would carry on a long-term project of developing a final product
that includes hES cells with WARF looking over its shoulder?2 94 In this
scenario, in the absence of invalidation of the patent claims, a good solution might be complete compulsory licensing.
In general, however, it is not good policy to use the patent system
to ameliorate problems that exist due to other political decisions.2 95
First, companies thrive on the certainty and predictability associated
with patents. In order to foster an environment of successful patent
licensing, parties need to be able to value a patent. If it became standard
practice to eliminate or diminish patent property rights for political reasons, this would open the door to changes in the value of patents each
time a new party took over the Presidency or the Congress. Second, a
better way for Congress to deal with the issue is to address President
Bush's decision directly. Federal funding of basic hES cell research
would be the best way to speed up innovation in the field. Compulsory
292. Eisenberg, supra note 101, at 1074-78.
293. See discussion supra note 98.
294. See FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
PERFORMANCE

379, 392 (1970).

295. See Rai, supra note 102, at 816.
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licensing should only be proposed in extreme cases, such as to
ameloriate problems of getting life-saving drugs to developing nations
that cannot afford to pay prices as set by developed nations' markets.296
In the absence of such extreme cases, patent law should be removed
from politics. Regarding President Bush's decision on hES cells, if
Congress can find the votes to overcome WARF's product claims in
some way as described above, then perhaps it can instead use those
votes to address President Bush's decision directly.
CONCLUSION

This article has discussed some of the theory that must be considered when attempting to determine whether patent claims fail to serve
the incentive goals of the patent system. Problems arise because the
patent system sometimes focuses too closely on a single invention,
ignoring the effects of issuing a property right on the incentives of subsequent inventors. Additionally, problems arise in the specific field of
biopharmaceutical inventions because the courts have overlooked the
wisdom of enforcing the product-of-nature prohibition on patentablility.
Based on this theory, this article concludes that the claims issued to
WARF covering hES cells are overly broad and detrimental to the field.
This problem is exacerbated by President Bush's decision to withhold
federal funds for any research performed on hES cells derived from
embryos destroyed after August 9, 2001. In light of these obstructions,
courts should invalidate or narrowly construe the scope of the WARF
product claims. Additionally, Congress may invalidate the WARF hES
cell product claims as part of any response to President Bush's hES cell
decision. A better approach, though, is to allow standard patent law procedures to take their course. In general, the PTO and the courts should
adopt stricter standards by enforcing existing patent law when dealing
with the patenability of upstream, basic research, much as it did when
dealing with DNA patent applications. In the future, similar situations
will surely arise. To avoid the uncertainty presently facing biotechnology companies over how to value such patents, the PTO and courts
should consistently strive to issue only claims narrowly tailored to the
inventive step as described in the specification.

296. See Section 5(b) of World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session,
Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, Doha, Adopted on Nov. 14, 2002;
Frederick M. Abbott, Compulsory Licensing for Public Health Needs: The TRIPS Agenda at the
WTO After the Doha Declaration on Public Health, Occasional Paper 9, Quaker United Nations
Office, (Feb. 2002).

